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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
VoLUME 73 SEPTEMBER 1987 NUMBER 6 
FEDERALISM, STATE COURTS, AND SECTION 1983 
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.* 
T HE law of federal courts is hardly a model of clarity. The body of judicial decisions catalogued roughly under the case or con-
troversy requirement embraces principles that are both elusive and 
inconsistently applied.1 The features that distinguish the powers of 
article III and article I judges are notoriously unfathomable.2 The 
"arising under" jurisdiction defies definition.3 The content of the 
eleventh amendment limitation of judicial authority cannot be as-
certained by either logic or examination of the constitutional text;' 
And the power of the Congress to manipulate the appellate juris-
diction of the United States Supreme Court remains both contro-
verted11 and, to our good fortune, largely untested.6 
* James Gould Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. Mar-
tin Redish, Mike Wells, and Paul LeBel provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this essay. Drew Dolson supplied much-needed research assistance. 
1 See generally Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 68 (1984) (arguing that the 
"injury" analysis of standing has not resulted in inconsistency of application). 
• See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 105 (1982); 
see also National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 584-600 (1949) 
(surveying allocation of powers and jurisdiction conferred by articles I and Ill). 
3 See generally Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-
12 (1982) (discussing "arising under" jurisdiction); H. Fink & M. Tushnet, Federal Jurisdic-
tion: Policy and Practice 470 (1984) (same). 
• See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-56 (1908) (attempting to determine 
scope of eleventh amendment); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1889) (same). 
• See generally M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial 
Power 7-34 (1980) (discussing the authority of Congress to control the jurisdiction of article 
III courts). 
• But see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (statute withdrawing appellate 
jurisdiction of United States Supreme Court upheld). 
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The principles that regulate the relationship between the state 
and federal courts, however, easily rank among the most byzantine 
of the entire federal courts jurisprudence. The operation of two au-
tonomous judicial systems within the same geographical boundary 
is a matter of no small complexity. The supremacy clause, of 
course, assures a fundamental primacy to federal tribunals. To 
mitigate federal intrusion, however, the Supreme Court has fash-
ioned a bevy of related jurisdictional doctrines that channel exer-
cises of the national judicial power. This complex patchwork-
requiring, under various circumstances, abstention, exhaustion, 
equitable restraint, and the like7-has substantially complicated 
the federal litigation process. 
No doubt much of this effort, and perhaps even much of the 
resulting confusion, is unavoidable. In a dual court system, it is not 
only essential that principles be set forth allocating the powers to 
be exercised by the constituent judiciaries, but that standards be 
developed to determine how each tribunal will deal with the other. 
These, in any circumstances, are not simple tasks.8 
The problems arising from this natural tension, however, have 
been further complicated by the nature of the evolving relationship 
between the state and federal judicial systems. During the first 
century of our history, state courts enjoyed, at least relatively 
speaking, a substantial autonomy from their federal counterparts.9 
After the Civil War, however, a program of federal oversight grad-
ually began to take shape. The provisions of the Civil War amend-
ments promised a significant revision in concepts of state sover-
eignty. The magnitude of that alteration, however, has provided 
the focus of our most pervasive, and most tenacious, constitutional 
7 Consider, for example, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (absten-
tion); Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstention); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971) (doctrine of equitable restraint); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (limited ex-
haustion requirement); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (limiting habeas corpus 
review). 
8 Consider, for example, de Tocqueville's statement: 
As the Constitution of the U.S. recognized two distinct sovereignties, in presence of 
each other, represented in a judicial point of view by two distinct classes of courts of 
justice, the utmost care taken in defining their separate jurisdictions would have been 
insufficient to prevent frequent collisions between those tribunals. 
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 147 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). 
9 I speak here, of course, of supervision by federal trial courts. Since at least the time of 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), state courts have been supervised 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
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debate. Substantively, the federalism controversy has played itself 
out vividly in the interpretation of the clauses of the fourteenth 
amendment. Procedurally, the debate has been vigorous as well. 
But surprisingly, the battle has centered on an exercise in statu-
tory interpretation.10 The modern interplay between state and fed-
eral courts has been intricately tied to the meaning, scope, and 
content of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11 This essay will consider a particu-
larly troubling subset of the law of federal-state judicial interac-
tion: the relationship between the section 1983 cause of action and 
state judicial process. 
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the deprivation of "any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States. "~2 When the abrogation of civil liberties 
is alleged to have occurred by means of state judicial process, how-
ever, particularly thorny problems arise. The statute, by its terms, 
applies broadly to all state actors. But local tribunals have tradi-
tionally enjoyed a variety of shields from national interference. 
The Supreme Court's treatment of the dilemma has been less than 
satisfying. Consider the most prominent examples. 
Applying an essentially historical model in Mitchum v. Foster/3 
the high court ruled that the framers of section 1983 intended the 
cause of action to extend to injunctive claims directed at pending 
state judicial process.14 Apparently ignoring that historical argn-
ment in Younger v. Harris/5 the Justices announced a doctrine of 
equitable restraint that all but forecloses injunctive interference 
with state cases.16 The Court has u~:;ed the legislative intent of sec-
tion 1983 to recognize, despite the language of the statute, an abso-
lute immunity from damage claims for local judicial officers.17 
10 The Younger doctrine appears to be strictly an example of judge-made law, as opposed 
to statutory interpretation. I argue below, however, that Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 
(1972), casts doubt on such a vision of Younger. Accordingly, the decision must be seen as 
an interpretation of§ 1983. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 77 for text of the statute . 
.. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
13 407 u.s. 225 (1972). 
1
• See id. at 242. 
15 401 u.s. 37 (1971). 
" See id. at 43-44. 
17 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967). See generally Rosenberg, Stump v. 
Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 Va. L. Rev. 833 (1978) (discussing the 
Supreme Court's reaffirmance of the judicial immunity doctrine). 
962 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 73:959 
Recently, however, the Court ruled that the "intention" of section 
1983 did not foreclose the issuance of prospective federal relief 
against state judges.18 The "history" of section 1983, reflecting a 
substantial distrust of local judicial process, has been employed to 
relieve a plaintiff of the burden of exhausting state judicial reme-
dies prior to seeking federal redress.19 The doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, however, has been held fully applicable to section 1983 
claims, as the result of a refusal by the Court to embrace the same 
historical premise. 20 In short, the Supreme Court has addressed 
the relationship between section 1983 and state courts desired by 
the statute's framers in a variety of contexts and by means of a 
number of supposedly distinct inquiries. With apparent equal fa-
cility, the Justices have concluded that the section 1983 cause of 
action does, and does not, incorporate a heavy dose of deference to 
state judiciaries. The final judicial product, therefore, is a course 
that is massively difficult to navigate. The propriety of the Court's 
handiwork will be the focus of the discussion that follows. 
First, I consider in more depth the interrelationship between the 
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 187121 and the develop-
ment of federal jurisdictional principles. As I have suggested, the 
Court appears to have implemented dramatically different visions 
of the appropriate solicitude to be afforded local judicial process in 
assessing the validity of a section 1983 claim. Given the essentially 
historical or intentional model of statutory interpretation that the 
Court has claimed to employ, it is difficult to understand how the 
Justices can expect to have it both ways. One would guess that the 
drafters of the Civil Rights Act either meant to incorporate tradi-
tional notions of deference to state judicial actors, or they did not. 
The random and inconsistent use of legislative purpose to measure 
statutory demands is hardly an advisable method of interpretation. 
Not surprisingly, the manipulation of statutory intention reflected 
in the Court's decisions has led to claims that some of the corner-
stones of federal courts jurisprudence are illegitimate.22 
18 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540 (1984). 
10 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). 
20 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980). 
21 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1982)). 
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (widely known as the Ku Klux Act) was the 
predecessor to § 1983. See the discussion in Part I infra. 
•• See, e.g., Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers and the Limits of the Judicial 
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In Part II, then, I explore the legislative intent behind section 
1983. My particular concern is the drafters' design, or lack of it, 
that the provision secure relief against state judicial process. I con-
clude that the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the 
statute's framers sought to provide a federal cause of action to 
remedy miscarriages of justice at the hands of state jurists. It 
hardly overstates the case, in fact, to suggest that forcing state ju-
dicial officers to toe the constitutional mark was one of the pri-
mary motivations for the enactment of section 1983. 
Part III considers the relevance of this historical claim. Section 
1983, I argue, was designed to afford an extremely intrusive federal 
remedy. Given the exigency under which the enactment was 
passed, deference to local officials was hardly a concern of the 
drafters. Yet the circumstances of the Reconstruction South are 
not our own. Nor could the framers of the statute have envisioned 
the role that section 1983 plays in our present constitutional struc-
ture. Rather than serving as a vehicle to assure minimum legal pro-
tection for blacks and oppressed Unionists, section 1983 now pro-
vides a conduit for the presentation of all constitutional claims 
against state and local actors. An interventionist cause of action 
under the Civil Rights Act, therefore, creates frictions with the in-
dependent operation of state judiciaries that did not exist a cen-
tury ago. As a result, the argument for discarding the intention of 
section 1983's framers carries substantial appeal. 
Departing from statutory design, however, poses major problems 
of judicial legitimacy. Updating statutes, ignoring intention, and 
modifying enactments to suit present need each suggest substan-
tial departures from traditional visions of the judicial role. In the 
fmal Part, I conclude that reasonable modern interpretation of sec-
tion 1983 does not demand such radical surgery. Given the broad 
scope of the modern section 1983 cause of action, it may well be 
that the statute can achieve its underlying purposes only by incor-
porating aspects of deference to local officials that the framers 
would not have embraced. Borrowing then from other fields of le-
Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 86 (1984); Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstruct-
ing Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1143 (1977); Zeigler, A Reassessment of the 
Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 Duke L.J. 987, 
988; Nichol, An Activism of Ambivalence (Book Review), 98 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 320 n.28 
(1984). 
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gal and statutory analysis, I suggest an interpretive strategy that 
allows section 1983 to accomplish its modern mission as the central 
vehicle of constitutional enforcement without abrogating the fun-
damental intentions of the statute's drafters. 
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND SECTION 1983 
Perhaps the strongest and most direct legislative statement con-
cerning the relationship between the state and federal courts is the 
Anti-Injunction Act.23 This statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides that 
"a court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay 
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act 
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to pro-
tect or effectuate its judgments."24 It should not be surprising,. 
then, that the most complete judicial exploration of the relation-
ship between the section 1983 cause of action and the deference 
appropriately afforded state courts appears in a case interpreting 
the Anti-Injunction Act. 
Mitchum v. Foster,25 decided in 1972, ruled that section 1983 is 
an "expressly authorized" exception to the Act.26 At one level, the 
decision was a surprising one. The 1871 Civil .Rights Act hardly 
creates an exception to the injunctive ban in express terms. 
Mitchum, however, determined that an "expressly authorized" ex-
ception results from any statutory enactment "clearly creating a 
federal right or remedy [that] ... could be given its intended 
scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."27 This formula-
tion has been vigorously criticized.28 Regardless of its merits, how-
ever, the "intended scope" determination required the Court to ex-
amine both the goals and the desired breadth of section 1983. The 
majority opinion's conclusions were of interest. 
Citing the 1875 decision in Ex parte Virginia,29 the Justices con-
cluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was "intended to enforce 
23 28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1982). 
2
' Id. 
2
" 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum, the plaintiff sought an injunction against a 
prosecutorial proceeding to close down his bookstore. 
26 Id. at 243. 
21 Id. at 238. 
26 See Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 329 (1978); 
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717, 733-39 (1977). 
20 100 u.s. 339 (1879). 
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the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'against state action, 
. . . whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial.' "30 
Quoting statements offered by several of the statute's key congres-
sional supporters, the Mitchum opinion suggested that the framers 
of section 1983 viewed state judiciaries as having "proven them-
selves [in]competent":31 either "powerless to stop deprivations or 
. . . in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of feder-
ally protected rights."32 According to the Court, the statute's draft-
ers debated "not about whether the predecessor of § 1983 extended 
to actions of state courts, but whether this innovation was neces-
sary or desirable."33 Having determined that state judicial officers 
shared the prevalent Southern antipathy toward nationally secured 
liberties, the proponents of the legislation attempted to ensure 
both legal and equitable relief in federal tribunals.34 Accordingly, 
Mitchum held that section 1983 "is an Act of Congress that falls 
within the 'expressly authorized' exception of [the Anti-Injunction 
Act]."35 
For present purposes at least, it is unimportant whether the 
Mitchum decision is an acceptable reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Re-
gardless of the validity of that interpretive claim, the portrait the 
opinion paints of the design of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is clear. 
The evils that the enactment sought to cure-in general terms, 
wholesale deprivations of basic civil liberties-were thought to be 
ignored, or even aided, by state judiciaries. The intended scope of 
the legislation, therefore, necessarily demands the availability of 
equitable interference with state judicial process. That vision of 
section 1983's purposes, however, creates real tensions with the 
Court's decision from the previous term in Younger v. Harris.36 
Younger's conclusion is well known. In this case too a section 
1983 litigant sought injunctive relief against a pending state suit. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Black concluded, however, that "the 
•• Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) (empha-
sis added in Mitchum)). 
•• Id. (quoting remarks of Sen. Osborn, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871) 
[hereinafter 42 Globe]). 
•• Id. at 240. 
•• Id. at 241-42. 
•• See id. 
•• Id. at 243 . 
•• 401 u.s. 37 (1971). 
966 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 73:959 
national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending 
state court proceedings except under special circumstances" barred 
the action.37 According to Justice Black, "[t]he notion of 'comity,' 
that is, a proper respect for state functions," rooted in "Our Feder-
alism," was the "vital consideration" demanding dismissal.38 The 
subsequent Mitchum decision, of course, claimed not to "question 
or qualify in any way" the "principles of equity, comity, and feder-
alism" on which Younger had so recently been based.39 As anum-
ber of commentators have stressed, however, the distinction is less 
than convincing.40 Mitchum suggests that the Reconstruction Con-
gress enacting section 1983 weighed the federal-state balance, at 
least when the normal principles of equity jurisprudence were 
met/1 in favor of national intervention. Younger, then, appears to 
be at odds with the congressional mandate.42 
Setting aside for the moment the question of Younger's legiti-
macy, it is clear that the deference toward state judiciaries that 
Younger demands of section 1983 litigants cannot be squared with 
the language of the Mitchum decision. Mitchum bespoke distrust 
of "incompetent" and "powerless" local tribunals.43 Younger's 
progeny offer "scrupulous regard [to] the rightful independence of 
state governments."44 Although Mitchum described state judges as 
a significant part of the problem,45 the Younger cases refuse to de-
part from the "'principle that state courts have the solemn respon-
sibility equally with the federal [courts] to safeguard constitutional 
rights."46 Younger's doctrine of restraint is expressly rooted in a 
fear that intervention would "reflec[t] negatively upon the state 
court's" willingness to recognize these federal rights.47 The premise 
that the Younger cases take such strides to avoid lies at 
37 ld. at 41. 
38 ld. at 44. 
39 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243. 
40 See sources cited supra note 22. 
•• See Redish, supra note 22, at 88; see also infra note 214 (discussion of Younger as a 
principle of equity jurisprudence). 
n See Nichol, supra note 22, at 320 n.28. 
43 See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240-41. 
« Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1979) (quoting Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 
u.s. 45, 50 (1941)). 
•• See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240-42. 
•• Trainor, 431 U.S. at 443 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974)). 
47 Id. at 443 (quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462)). 
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Mitchum's, if not section 1983's, core. 
But this long-recognized tension in jurisdictional analysis is only 
the most prominent example of the inconsistent application of sec-
tion 1983 to state judiciaries. Injunctions are not the sole tools by 
which federal judges can be said to interfere with their local coun-
terparts. In Pierson v. Ray,48 for example, the Supreme Court 
ruled that state and local judges are absolutely immune from sec-
tion 1983 damage claims arising from their judicial actions.49 The 
statute, of course, alludes to no such immunity. Its terms suggest, 
rather, that a cause of action at law or in equity lies against "every 
person" who under color of law causes a deprivation of federally 
protected rights. So the Pierson Court grounded the case for im-
munity in the legislative intent of the framers of the statute. Pri-
marily because "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at 
common law than the immunity of judges from liability for dam-
ages," the Justices concluded that the "legislative record gives no 
clear indication that Congress meant to abolish" such traditional 
protections. 50 
More recently, however, Pulliam v. Allen51 seemed to take a dif-
ferent tack. 52 There the Court ruled that judicial immunity was not 
a bar to prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. Again, the 
result was based on legislative intent. Almost as if Pierson and 
Younger had never been decided, the opinion declared that "Con-
gress enacted § 1983 . . . to provide an independent avenue for 
the protection of federal constitutional rights . . . because 'state 
courts were being used to harass and injure individuals' .... "53 
Even more surprisingly, the Court noted that "every member of 
Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges would be lia-
•• 386 u.s. 547 (1967). 
•• See id. at 553-55. 
•• Id. at 553-54 • 
• , 466 u.s. 522 (1984). 
•• Pulliam made an explicit holding of the dicta from Supreme Court of Virginia v. Con-
sumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 735 (1980) ("[W]e have never held that judicial immunity abso-
lutely insulates judges from declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to their judicial 
acts."). See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 536. 
I realize, of course, that there are distinctions to be drawn among the circumstances 
presented in Younger, Pulliam, and Pierson. Some of these are discussed in Section III.C of 
this Article. The inconsistency I mean to emphasize lies in the Court's use of Reconstruction 
history. 
•• Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 540 (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240). 
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hie under § 1983."54 Pierson's history and Pulliam's history are im-
possible to square. Nor, unfortunately, do the judicial pirouettes 
stop there. 
Injunctive decrees and damage awards enforced by federal 
courts against state judges are perhaps the most direct, and the 
most threatening, interchanges between the two judicial systems. 
The judiciaries necessarily interact in more subtle ways. If the sub-
ject matter of a federal section 1983 action involves claims that 
have been previously litigated in a state forum, the appropriate 
deference to be afforded the prior ruling must be determined. Al-
len v. McCurry,55 speaking to that issue, held that normal princi-
ples of collateral estoppel apply to section 1983 claims.56 Accord-
ingly, a section 1983 tribunal must give binding effect to a state 
court determination in which the parties have been given a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims.57 McCurry's theory 
is reminiscent of Younger and Pierson. According to the opinion, 
"nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any 
Congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state-court judg-
ment."58 The acceptance of collateral estoppel principles was 
thought essential to avoid the expression of a "general distrust of 
the capacity of state courts to render correct decisions on consitu-
tional issues."59 That very distrust, of course, is the underlying 
premise of Mitchum and Pulliam. It also provides the rationale for 
yet another cornerstone of federal jurisdiction, Monroe v. Pape.60 
McCurry addressed the ramifications of a section 1983 plaintiff's 
prior litigation in the case forum. Monroe, on the other hand, ex-
plored the significance of the failure of a federal civil rights litigant 
to seek available redress in the state courts before filing suit.61 Be-
sides ushering in a major transformation of the section 1983 cause 
of action by offering a more generous interpretation of the "under 
color of law" requirement,62 Monroe ruled that civil rights plain-
.. Id. at 540 (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 558-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting)) . 
•• 449 u.s. 90 (1980). 
•• See id. at 105. 
•• See id. at 103-05. 
•• Id. at 103-04. 
•• Id. at 105 . 
•• 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
81 See id. at 174-82. 
•• See id. at 181-87 ("under color of state Jaw" includes actions by state officials that are 
in violation of state law). It is not my purpose in this essay to consider the propriety of 
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tiffs are not required to exhaust state judicial remedies before 
seeking federal relief. 68 Once again, the Court's conclusion was 
grounded in the legislative history of section 1983.64 Citing the 
statements of a variety of the statute's sponsors, the Court deter-
mined that the framers of the Civil Rights Act saw state courts as 
part of the problem, not as a potential solution to the abrogation 
of federal interests. In the "judicial tribunals [of the states] one 
class is unable to secure the enforcement of their rights."65 "Justice 
closes the door of her temples."66 The "courts of the southern 
states fail and refuse to do their duty."67 These and similar state-
ments by members of the 1871 Congress were offered to demon-
strate that it would be inconsistent with the statute's design to rel-
egate the victims of oppressive state actions to local courts. 68 Thus 
Monroe v. Pape, the centerpiece of section 1983 jurisprudence, is 
founded on the historical premises embraced by Mitchum and Pul-
liam, but rejected by Younger, Pierson, and McCurry.69 
To be sure, these diverse lines of federal courts analysis are 
treated as autonomous and independent entities by the Supreme 
Court. Their contradictory results are rendered less apparent by a 
jurisprudence that seemingly demands no interrelationship be-
tween the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the princi-
ples of equitable intervention, for example, or between the pro-
spective and retrospective liability of state judges for civil rights 
violations. So rigid a formalism, however, hides little and reveals 
much. 
Monroe's holding on the under color of law issue. Justice Douglas' opinion in Monroe has 
recently been criticized in Zagrans, Under Color of What Law?: A Reconstructed Model of 
Section 1983 Liability, 71 Va. L. Rev. 499 (1985). Professor Zagrans essentially resurrects 
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting argument in Monroe v. Pape. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 202-
59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The extent to which this argument bears upon my thesis is 
discussed infra note 165. 
•• See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. 
.. See id. at 172-84. 
•• Id. at 177 (quoting Rep. Burchard, 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 315). 
•• Id. at 178 (quoting Sen. Pratt, 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 505). 
•• Id. at 179 (quoting Rep. Voorhees, 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 179 (speaking in 
opposition to the bill)). 
•• See id. at 176-80. 
•• Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), reached a similar conclusion on the 
issue of exhaustion of state administrative remedies. See id. at 502-12. Like Monroe, Patsy 
justified its conclusion by turning to the legislative history of§ 1983. Patsy determined that 
the framers of the Civil Rights Act expressed "mistrust . . . for the factfinding processes of 
state institutions." Id. at 506. Patsy, therefore, is at odds with the reading of § 1983 inten-
tion reflected in Younger, McCurry, and Pierson. 
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None of the six cases, or lines of cases, described purport to be 
exercises in constitutional interpretation. Mitchum, Pulliam, and 
Monroe, the decisions authorizing federal judicial intervention, of-
fer statutory justifications for their assertions of power. The rul-
ings demanding heightened deference to state courts, Younger, 
Pierson, and McCurry, do so without reference to constitutional 
mandate. And there is good reason for the omission. Younger's vi-
sion of "Our Federalism" would be difficult to locate in the consti-
tutional charter. Justice Black, a theorist who usually had no 
trouble identifying the demands of constitutional principle,70 char-
acterized it only as a "national policy."71 The tenth amendment, 
one supposes, would be the most likely textual source. But that 
provision has repeatedly eluded judicial efforts to measure its con-
tent.72 And, at a minimum, Mitchum would have to be read as a 
"carving out" from traditional notions of state sovereignty any im-
munity from injunctive intervention enjoyed by state courts.73 
Pierson's doctrine of judicial immunity from damage actions, like 
the host of other absolute and qualified section 1983 immunities, 
fmds its genesis in the common law.74 In addition, if Pulliam's de-
termination that state judges enjoy no similar shield from prospec-
tive relief is correct, then a residual constitutional protection from 
damage suits seems even more implausible. McCurry applied con-
cepts of collateral estoppel to section 1983 claims because it uncov-
ered no "congressional intent" to dislodge traditional rules of pre-
clusion.711 Implicitly, the opinion suggests that a contrary 
determination would have withstood constitutional scrutiny.76 
As a result, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the 
opinions described above are nonconstitutional in nature. All are 
section 1983 cases as well. That leaves the question of their inter-
10 See, for example, Justice Black's opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing for absolutist view of the first amendment). 
11 Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. 
12 Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the 
tenth amendment limited the federal government's authority to regulate state and local gov-
ernments) with Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Na-
tional League of Cities). 
· 
13 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976). 
14 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). 
15 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980). 
18 See id. at 104-05. 
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relationship in a more complex posture than the opinions of the 
Supreme Court suggest. Mitchum, Pulliam, and Monroe interpret 
section 1983 to provide an intrusive cause of action that is to oper-
ate largely undeterred by traditional notions of deference to local 
judicial officers. Younger, Pierson, and McCurry, on the other 
hand, read the same statute to demand substantial solicitude for 
the independence of state judiciaries. It simply cannot be the case 
that both camps of decisions represent accurate interpretations of 
the language and legislative history of section 1983. Accordingly, it 
is to that task that I now turn. • 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1983 
The language of section 1983 provides that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.77 
In seeking to determine whether the section 1983 cause of action 
extends to deprivations of "rights, privileges, or immunities" at the 
hands of state judges, the phrase "every person" must provide the 
point of departure. It is uncontroversial that " [ w ]hat a legislature 
says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the 
legislative intent."78 And "every person," as Justice Douglas 
claimed, presumably means "every person, not every person ex-
cept judges."79 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1871, at the time 
of its enactment, read "any person" rather than "every person,"80 
both terms denote all-inclusiveness. The source of the language 
eventually codified in section 1983 strengthens the suggestion that 
state judges were intended to be brought within its purview. 
71 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
•• 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.03, at 82 (4th ed. 1984). 
•• Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
80 The present § 1983 underwent minor revision (including the "every person" alteration) 
and recodification in the general statutory revision of 1874. See Rev. Stat.§ 1979 (1873-74); 
see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11, 14-16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (revisions 
were nonsubstantive); 2 Cong. Rec. 129, 646-48, 825-27 (1874) (congressional remarks em-
phasizing preservation of statutory substance). 
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A. The 1866 Act 
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the specific precur-
sor of section 1983, was patterned after a criminal provision in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.81 Employing the now familiar phraseol-
ogy, section two of the 1866 statute declared that "any person who, 
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom," 
deprived an inhabitant of a state of certain federally protected 
rights was subject to a "fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or 
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. "82 Much to the dis-
satisfaction of the Reconstruction Congress, President Johnson ve-
toed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Johnson's veto message made 
clear that one of his principal objections to the statute was the 
alarming impact he believed it would have on state judiciaries.83 
The potential conviction of state judges had, in fact, been a theme 
considered by both houses. 84 An amendment excluding judges from 
the operation of the law had been offered and rejected. 85 Senator 
Trumbull, one of the 1866 Act's chief proponents, delivered a 
point-by-point refutation of the veto message on the floor of the 
Senate. Trumbull argued that the doctrine of judicial immunity 
"places officials above the law. It is the very doctrine out of which 
the rebellion was hatched. "86 On the House side, Congressman 
Lawrence declared that "it is better to invade the judicial power of 
the State than permit it to invade, strike down, and destroy the 
civil rights of citizens. "87 The Congress responded by overriding 
the presidential veto and enacting the 1866 Act as law. 
The "any person" language of the 1871 Act, therefore, was born 
in context. The Congress and the President had joined issue on the 
applicability of the phrase to state judges five years earlier. Thus 
when Congressman Shellabarger introduced the Civil Rights Act of 
81 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1982)). 
82 Id. § 2. 
83 See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679, 1680-81 (1866) [hereinafter 39 Globe). 
84 See Zagrans, supra note 62, at 544. 
80 See 39 Globe, supra note 83, at 1156. 
88 Id. at 1758 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). See generally Note, Liability of Judicial Of-
ficers Under Section 1983, 79 Yale L.J. 322, 327 & n.36 (1969) (quoting similar statements 
by other members of Congress). 
87 39 Globe, supra note 83, at 1837 (remarks of Rep. Lawrence). 
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1871 he described section two of the Act-the predecessor of sec-
tion 1983-as a straightforward, almost noncontroversial provision 
modeled on the 1866 Act: "That section provides a criminal pro-
ceeding in identically the same case as this one provides a civil 
remedy .... "88 Shellabarger also informed his colleagues that the 
proposed act was "remedial, and in aid of the preservation of 
human liberty." Accordingly, it would be "liberally and benefi-
cently construed . . . [providing] the largest latitude consistent 
with the words employed. "89 Both the language and the legislative 
legacy under which section 1983 was proposed, therefore, give rise 
to at least a substantial presumption that the statute was designed 
to reach state judicial actors. 
B. The 1871 Congress 
But what of the attitudes of the Congress of 1871? On March 23, 
1871, President Grant sent a message to the Reconstruction Con-
gress seeking legislation that would "effectually secure life, liberty, 
and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United 
States."90 Prior bearings of the Senate Committee on Reconstruc-
tion had revealed the existence of violent outrages directed against 
blacks and sympathetic whites throughout the South. 91 These acts 
were believed to be the work of the newly emerged Ku Klux Klan, 
a secretive organization thought to be led by former Confederate 
officers. 
Grant's message was referred to a select committee created for 
the occasion, and five days later the bill was reported to the House 
of Representatives. Catching the tenor of the time, Congressman 
Stoughton argued that the provision was needed because " [ t ]here 
exists . . . in the southern States a treasonable conspiracy against 
the lives, persons and property of Union citizens, less formidable it 
may be, but not less dangerous, to American liberty than that 
which inaugurated the horrors of the rebellion. "92 Within a month, 
section 1983 was one of a number of provisions enacted as the Ku 
88 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) . 
•• ld. 
•• ld. at 244 (message of President Grant). 
•• See L. Warsoff, Equality and tbe Law 109-10 (1938); Gressman, The Unhappy History 
of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1329-30 (1952). 
•• 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 320 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton). 
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Klux Act of 1871.93 The Supreme Court was thus apparently cor-
rect in Collins v. Hardyman94 when it declared that section 1983 
"was passed by a partisan vote in a highly inflamed atmosphere. It 
was preceded by spirited debate which pointed out its grave char-
acter and susceptibility to abuse .... "95 
The refusal of state courts to protect the fundamental human 
liberties of both Unionists and the newly freed slaves was a major 
focus of the legislative debates on both sections one and two of the 
Act. 96 That is hardly surprising. Given the recent passage of the 
Civil War amendments, if state judiciaries could have been 
counted on to enforce the provisions of the federal constitution, 
the entire legislative scheme would have been unnecessary. The 
proponents of the statute leveled two broad charges at state courts. 
First, as the result of Klan intimidation, and perhaps empathy, lo-
93 See 1 B. Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights 591-653 (1970). 
The Senate passed the Act 36-13 on April 19, 1871, and the House followed the next day. 
See Zeigler, supra note 22, at 1019 • 
•• 341 u.s. 651 (1951). 
•• ld. at 657. 
•• See, e.g., 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 320 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton) ("[I]t is impossi-
ble for the civil authorities ... to punish those who perpetrate these outrages."); id. at 322 
("[State court] denial of the equal protection of the laws is too clear to admit of ques-
tion .... "); see also id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); id. at 429 (remarks of Rep. 
Beatty); id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. Pratt); id. at 654 (remarks of Sen. Osborn); id. app. at 
153 (remarks of Rep. Garfield); id. app. at 179 (remarks of Rep. Voorhees); id. app. at 277 
(remarks of Rep. Porter); id. app. at 315 (remarks of Rep. Burchard). 
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was perhaps the least controversial, and the 
least debated, provision of the statute. Several of the references that follow relate either to 
section two (creating certain federal crimes) or to the Act generally. In Patsy v. Board of 
Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that "some of the debates relat-
ing to § 2 ... are also relevant to our discussion of § 1." Id. at 502 n.5. 
That is a reasonable judgment. Section one, by its terms, creates a broad cause of ac-
tion-without expressly recognizing protections from scrutiny for state tribunals-against 
"any person" causing the deprivation of a constitutional right. The remaining provisions of 
the Act, as well as the debates over their enactment, provide the best circumstantial evi-
dence of the framers' desire, or lack thereof, to incorporate deference to state actors into 
this particular legislative scheme. The debates, as a whole, depict a consistent vision of the 
distrust the 1871 Congress entertained for state courts. That distrust, along with pointed 
references about the applicability of the statute to state judges and the aggressive nature of 
the entire enactment, combine, I claim below, to present a strong case for the full 
cognizability of state judicial acts under § 1983. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying 
text. "A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one 
general purpose and intent. . . . Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to . . . one 
section to be construed." 2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.05, at 90. 
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cal courts were portrayed as "under the control"97 of conspirators 
and "unable or unwilling to check the evil."98 "Violence and law-
lessness [being] universally prevalent," Republicans characterized 
state courts as "notoriously powerless to protect life, person and 
property."99 Congressman Beatty complained that prejudiced 
southern judges, "by reason of popular sentiment or secret organi-
zations ... [deny] the rights and privileges due an American citi-
zen."100 Senator Morton, speaking in terms fairly representative of 
the Act's supporters, 101 concluded that "the States do not protect 
the rights of the people; ... [and] State courts are powerless to 
redress these wrongs. The great fact remains that large classes of 
people ... are without legal remedy in the courts of the States."~02 
The framers of section 1983, in short, believed that local judges 
had abdicated their responsibility to ensure evenhanded enforce-
ment of the law.103 
The second accusation was even more serious. Not only were lo-
cal judiciaries "impotent,"104 legislators considered many judges to 
be in league with the Klan. Senator Osborn argued that state 
courts were under the influence of the Klan oath.105 Congressman 
Rainey claimed that local tribunals were "secretly in sympathy 
with the very evil against which we are striving."106 Congressman 
•• 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey). 
•• Id. at 321 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton). 
•• Id. at 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); see also id. at 244 (President Grant's message: 
"That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not 
doubt."). 
100 Id. at 429 (remarks of Rep. Beatty). 
101 See, e.g., id. at 653 (remarks of Sen. Osborn) ("If the state courts bad proven them-
selves competent to suppress the local disorders, or to maintain law and order, we should 
not have been called upon to legislate upon this subject at all."); id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. 
Pratt) ("[T]be arm of justice is paralyzed[;] ... punishment bas not been inflicted in a 
single case of the hundreds of outrages which have occurred."); id. at 368 (remarks of Rep. 
Sheldon) ("Governors, judges, and juries give way to a mania which sometimes seizes hold of 
the popular mind."); id. app. at 277 (remarks of Rep. Porter) ("[L]oyal men cannot obtain 
justice in the courts."). 
102 ld. app. at 252 (remarks of Sen. Morton). 
103 See, e.g., id. app. at 78 (remarks of Rep. Perry) ("[J]udges, having ears to hear, hear 
not."). 
, .. E.g., id. at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn) ("[T]he courts are impotent, the laws are 
annulled[,] ..• the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress."). 
10
" See id. app. at 653 (remarks of Sen. Osborn). 
lo& Id. app. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey). 
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Platt took the charge even further, alleging that 
the decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings, with 
almost despotic powers to carry out the partisan demands of the 
Legislature which elected them-powers which, almost without ex-
ception, have been exercised against Republicans without regard to 
law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs, outrageous viola-
tions, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution, unscrupu-
lous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history of 
parties in this country or any other.107 · 
Strong stuff, no doubt. But even wading through the demagoguery, 
the passages suggest that many of the framers of section 1983 con-
sidered state judges to be active and energetic participants in a 
pervasive effort to deprive a substantial segment of the southern 
populace of fundamental human liberties. 
Broadly speaking, therefore, the proponents of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 regarded state judges as central players in the southern 
tragedy they sought to eliminate. At best, local courts were afraid 
of the Klan. Accordingly, "[the state courts] only fail in efficency 
when a man of known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes 
their aid."108 At worst, southern judges could be "wholly inimical 
to the impartial administration of law and equity."109 As a result, 
section 1983 sought to address what its framers saw as a near com-
plete breakdown of justice in the South. The "records of the public 
tribunals," Republicans claimed, "are searched in vain for any evi-
dence of effective redress."110 
The opponents of the legislation were just as vehement. They 
also seemed to have little doubt of the provision's applicability to 
state tribunals. Congressman Voorhees rejected what he considered 
to be a central premise of the Civil Rights Act, "that the courts of 
the southern States fail and refuse to do their duty."m Others 
drew vivid portraits of the potential plight of southern judges 
should the bill be enacted. Congressman Lewis lamented that 
"[b]y the first section [i.e., section 1983] ... the judge of a State 
court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in 
101 Id. app. at 186 (remarks of Rep. Platt). 
108 Id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. Pratt). 
109 Id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey). 
110 Id. at 374 (remarks of Rep. Lowe). 
111 Id. app. at 179 (remarks of Rep. Voorhees). 
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the Federal court and subject to damages[,] . however honest 
and conscientious [his] decision may be."112 Congressman Arthur 
charged that "every judge in the state court ... will enter upon 
and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles 
suspended over him."113 Senator Thurman asked: "What is to be 
the case of a judge? ... Is he to be liable in an action? ... [I]t is 
the language of the bill; for there is no limitation whatsoever upon 
the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can 
be used."114 Thurman also stressed that fears of application of the 
statute to state judges were not fanciful: "There have been two or 
three instances already under the [Civil Rights Act of 1866] of 
State judges being taken into the United States district court . . . 
for the offense, forsooth, of honestly and conscientiously deciding 
the law to be as they understood it to be."115 
In a case from the 1960's recognizing judicial immunity under 
section 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit dismissed the relevance of such objections as "little more than 
opposition remarks," not to be given substantial credence unless 
proponents offered no reply.116 As one commentator has pointed 
out, Congressman Shellabarger-sponsor of the bill and a debater 
not unwilling to interrupt an adversary-was on the floor when 
such statements were made and he presented no rebuttal.117 Had 
the statute's drafters desired to escape the power of their oppo-
nents' claim, it would hardly have been difficult to insert language 
recognizing judicial or other common law immunities into the 
lengthy enactment. Moreover, as I have indicated, proponents of 
the Act regarded the need to force state judges to toe the constitu-
tional mark as a central premise of the legislation. But more im-
portantly, these arguments in mitigation are largely beside the 
point. The cramped interpretation suggested by the Third Circuit 
approaches the problem from the wrong direction. 
112 ld. at 385 (remarks of Rep. Lewis). 
113 ld. at 366 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); see also id. at 361 (remarks of Rep. Swann) 
("[The bill] turns the whole current of State jurisprudence into the Federal Courts .•.. "). 
114 Id. app. at 217 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). 
uo Id. 
111 Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 588 n.8 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 
(1967). 
117 See Note, supra note 86, at 328 n.40. Three times during the debates legislators 
claimed the Act applied to judges, and no one denied the allegation. See id. at 328. 
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It is perhaps possible, though only barely so, to claim that the 
statements of legislators do not conclusively prove that section 
1983 was designed to apply to local judges. But such proof, under 
normal principles of statutory construction, is unnecessary. By its 
express terms, section 1983 applies to "every person." There is, of 
course, "no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation than 
that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to 
mean what it plainly expresses."118 It is not apparent to me that 
the language of section 1983 can be reasonably seen as anything 
other than a model of clarity concerning its applicability to state 
judges. Nonetheless, a challenge to its "plain meaning" tradition-
ally demands a showing "that the provision itself is repugnant to 
the general purview of the act ... or [that] the legislative history 
... imports a different meaning."119 Given the overwhelming indi-
cation from the record that the framers thought the statute would 
apply to state courts, it is inconceivable that the burden of demon-
strating that the legislative history demands a result contrary to 
the language could be met. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the 
Court in Pulliam is apparently correct in its claim that "every 
Member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges 
would be liable under § 1983. "120 
C. The Legal Landscape 
Even if it is clear that the "any person" phraseology of section 
1983 was meant to include state judges, a variety of questions con-
cerning the interrelationship of the two judicial systems remain. It 
may well be that the legislative history suggests that judges, in 
their official capacities, can appropriately be the subject of either 
equitable or damage claims under the statute. But what of the 
need to exhaust state judicial remedies, or the applicability of 
traditional principles of collateral estoppel to section 1983 suits? 
The mere determination that judges are correct defendants hardly 
provides an answer to these more subtle clashes between state and 
federal courts. Perhaps because the text of the statute is silent on 
such issues, in cases like Monroe and McCurry the Supreme Court 
118 2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.01, at 73 (quoting Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 18-
19 (8th Cir. 1902)). 
"" I d. at 7 4. 
120 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540 (1984). 
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explored the intentions of section 1983's framers to determine 
their attitude toward state tribunals. Monroe, it will be recalled, 
concluded that the "legislative history" revealed the bill to be a 
remedy for state tribunals "unable or unwilling" to administer jus-
tice evenhandedly.121 McCurry, on the other hand, found that 
there was "nothing in the language or legislative history of§ 1983" 
to suggest that Congress intended "to deny binding effect to a 
state-court judgment . . . when the state court . . . has given the 
parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims,"122 and 
dismissed the argument that state courts could not be trusted to 
"render correct decisions on constitutional issues."123 
Monroe and McCurry cannot be correct representations of the 
framers' confidence in state court process. But the inquiry that 
they suggest seems a sensible one. Judge Posner has advocated a 
method of statutory interpretation labeled "imaginative recon-
struction."124 Acording to its dictates, "the judge should try to put 
himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how 
they would have wanted the statute applied to the case before 
him."1211 In some measure, that is what Monroe and McCurry at-
tempt to do. Neither exhaustion of remedies nor collateral estoppel 
in section 1983 suits has been treated as a constitutional issue. As 
a result, the Justices have, at least in theory, turned to the statute 
for guidance. Because the language of the provision offers little di-
rection, opinions have asked, in more and less direct ways, whether 
the framers of section 1983 would have demanded deference to 
state courts through exhaustion or collateral bar. Specifically, this 
inquiry has tended to focus-though reaching diametrically oppo-
site conclusions in the two lines of cases-on the level of trust the 
1871 Congress entertained for local judiciaries. The intention of 
the drafters, therefore, can here be of at least preliminary use. 
There is substantial direct evidence that the framers of the Civil 
Rights Act would have rejected an exhaustion requirement and the 
use of preclusion. Congressman Bingham, for example, claimed 
that even "[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to 
121 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961). 
1u Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980). 
123 I d. at 105. 
'"' See R. Posner, The Federal Courts 286-87 (1985). 
120 Id. 
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enforce the Constitution of the United States within their respec-
tive limits, must we wait for their action? Are not laws preventive, 
as well as remedial?m26 Arguing against waiting for local process to 
run its course, Congressman Elliott called for "immediate jurisdic-
tion through [the federal] courts, without the appeal or agency of 
the state."127 And opponents complained that section one of the 
Act "does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions" 
prior to federal intervention.128 Other comments suggest a heavy 
legislative preference for litigation in the federal courts, thus cast-
ing doubt on the use of collateral estoppel in section 1983 claims. 
Congressman Coburn suggested that the "United States courts are 
further above mere local influence than the county courts; their 
judges can act with more independence, cannot be put under ter-
ror, as local judges can."129 Congressman Dawes similarly claimed 
that there "is no tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice 
would be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation, 
and in severity, if need be, ... as that great tribunal of the 
Constitution. "130 
Nor need the inquiry stop there. It is also true, of course, that 
much of the foregoing analysis of legislative intent is relevant to 
the issue of deference to local judicial process. The mere fact that 
the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 created a cause of ac-
tion to be directed, at least in some instances, to local judges says 
much about their regard for state judiciaries. The strongest reason 
that the "any" or "every" person language cannot, on the basis of 
legislative intent alone, be read as embracing an exception for state 
j"~;1dges is that the abuses of local judiciaries played so prominent a 
role in the evils the statute was designed to address. Although that 
underlying goal may not, on its own, demonstrate that the framers 
of the statute would have afforded little deference to local process, 
it certainly provides support for such a claim. 
But perhaps the most telling circumstantial evidence of theRe-
construction Congress' willingness to override local process lies in 
128 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham). 
127 Id. at 389 (remarks of Rep. Elliot). 
128 Id. app. at 86 (remarks of Rep. Storm). For other comments weighing against exhaus-
tion, see id. at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id. at 375 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); id. at 448-49 
(remarks of Rep. Butler). 
129 Id. at 460 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 
130 Id. at 476 (remarks of Rep. Dawes). 
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the language of the statute itself. An examination of the remainder 
of the provisions of the Ku Klux Act of 1871 compels one to con-
clude that its drafters were basically unconcerned with potential 
offense to state officials. The modern section 1983 was but one of 
seven sections of the original Act. The other six provisions, which 
have since either expired or been repealed or recodified, 131 offer 
strong medicine. Section two provided a criminal sanction for the 
commission of a variety of conspiratorial acts. On the checklist of 
proscribed activities were conspiracy to "overthrow, or to put 
down, or to destroy by force the government of the United States"; 
"to levy war against the United States"; "to seize . . . any property 
of the United States"; "to prevent any person" from holding office 
"under the United States"; and to prevent "the election of any 
lawfully qualified person as an elector of the President or Vice-
President of the United States."~32 Section three addressed cases 
of "insurrection, domestic violence, [and] unlawful ... conspira-
cies" so pronounced that the state government "shall either be un-
able to protect, or shall, from any cause, fail . . . or refuse protec-
tion of the people. "133 The remedy the provision set forth was "the 
employment of the militia or the land and naval forces of the 
United States" at the direction of the President.134 Section three 
thus authorized the most intrusive remedy imaginable-martial 
law. It also anticipated that a state government might intentionally 
"refuse protection of the people."135 
Section four provided, in part, that when "constituted [state] au-
thorities are in complicity with . . . powerful and armed combina-
tions, . . . it shall be lawful for the President of the United States 
. . . to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, to the 
end that such rebellion may be overthrown."136 This provision was 
temporary, expiring "after the end of the next regular session of 
131 Section two of the Act, for example, was the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 
six preceded 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Section four expired "after the end of the next regular ses-
sion of Congress." Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (expired 1873) . 
... Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13, partially repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 
1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (current version of § 2 at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)). 
133 Id. § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14, repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, cb. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat. 641, 
644. 
13
' Id. 
13• Id. 
131 Id. § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (expired 1873). 
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Congress."137 It obviously contemplated, however, a complete dis-
ruption of local judicial process during its pendency. It also recog-
nized the possibility that lawful state governments would conspire 
with anti-Union terrorists. Section five required the taking of a 
non-conspiracy oath in open court by federal jurors.138 The final 
substantive section created a civil action against "any person" hav-
ing knowledge of acts which would violate various provisions of the 
statute and who, "having power to prevent or aid in preventing the 
same, shall neglect or refuse so to do. "139 
As a package then, the sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
offered a massively intrusive set of remedies to deal with what 
President Grant and the supporters of the legislation regarded as a 
national crisis only marginally less threatening than the war itself. 
It is perhaps helpful to recall that within months of its enactment, 
President Grant was forced to deploy its provisions by suspending 
habeas corpus in nine counties of South Carolina to combat law-
lessness "out of control."140 The statute thus reflected a legislative 
belief that drastic circumstances demand drastic responses.141 As 
Senator Edmonds put it, "every measure of constitutional legisla-
tion which will have a tendency to preserve life and liberty . . . 
ought to be resorted to."142 And as Senator Poole claimed, if this 
effort to ensure a "civil equality of all citizens" through the courts 
should "fail in its enforcement, the military power [would have to] 
be used."143 The various sections authorized the punishment of in-
surrection, the suspension of habeas corpus, and the use of the 
armed forces. Legislators who press for such sanctions are unlikely 
to have worried about the possibility that they might offend local 
jurists by casting doubt on the ability of state courts to decide on 
federal claims. Section six is particularly instructive in this regard. 
By authorizing suit against those who "have power to prevent" vio-
137 ld. 
"" See id. 
139 ld. § 6, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982)). 
140 W. McFeely, Grant: A Biography 370 (1981). 
141 See, e.g., 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 321 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton) ("The whole 
South . . . is rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy and bloodshed, which renders the worst 
Government on the face of the earth respectable by way of comparison. There is no security 
for life, person, or property."); id. app. at 199 (remarks of Rep. Snyder) ("Anarchy and 
violence are supreme .... "). 
142 ld. at 691 (remarks of Sen. Edmonds). 
143 Id. at 609 (remarks of Sen. Poole). 
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lations of the act but who refuse to do so, the Civil Rights Act 
expressly pierced sanctuaries of local sovereignty and embraced 
the use of federal judicial process against state officers who failed 
to protect civil liberties. The provision, like the bulk of the entire 
act, is thus anchored in a profound distrust of local officials. Were 
the legislative history of section 1983 to be read as incorporating a 
heavy dose of deference to state judicial process, it would, at a 
minimum, be wildly out of step with the remainder of the statute. 
The issue, of course, is not completely free from doubt. The sec-
tion 1983 cause of action, for example, was not placed within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts-a step that would have 
further expressed misgivings about local courts. But opponents of 
the statute correctly saw concurrent state court jurisdiction as a 
gesture based more in form than substance. Litigants asserting 
federal rights, especially in the Reconstruction climate, would 
hardly be likely to choose the state forum.144 Some have argued as 
well that because section one of the Civil Rights Act was so non-
controversial, it can be regarded as distinct from the tenor of the 
remainder of the statute.145 Emphasizing these factors, however, 
goes against the overwhelming weight of the legislative evidence. 
Section one was thought to provide no basis for objection because 
it offered far less potential for national domination than the bulk 
of its statutory counterparts. 146 Reading the provision as incorpo-
rating a deferential posture to local judges badly misses the forest 
in favor of an isolated tree or two. Basic canons of statutory inter-
pretation suggest that an act "is passed as a whole and not in parts 
or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent."147 
No doubt the "general purpose and intent" of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 is to assert the national power to guarantee protection of 
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
of the United States." To the extent that deference to local deci-
sionmakers interferes with that mission, the statutory mandate 
falls strongly on the side of federal intervention.148 
"' See, e.g., id. app. at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); see also Theis, Res Judicata in 
Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 859, 868 (1976) 
("the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts was probably considered to be of little practical 
importance"). 
,.. See Zagrans, supra note 62, at 548-60. 
HI See 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 568 (remarks of Sen. Edmonds); id. at app. 68 (re-
marks of Rep. Shellabarger). 
H 7 2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.05, at 90. 
HI See Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the 
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III. INTERPRETING SECTION 1983 
The legislative history of section 1983 clearly indicates that its 
drafters were untroubled by such niceties as solicitude for local ju-
rists. It is also clear, however, that this attitude was shaped by 
their perceptions of emergency in the Reconstruction South. The 
severity of the moment called for a remedy that was effective, not 
deferential. But over a century later, the exigencies of Reconstruc-
tion no longer exist. If the draftsmen of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 could reasonably worry that state judges were in league with 
the Ku Klux Klan, or fundamentally antithetical to civil liberties, 
we need not. Accordingly, some have argued that section 1983 
should be interpreted to take this change of circumstance into ac-
count.149 It seems doubtful, however, that change of condition 
alone merits the judicial creation of a large exception to a broadly 
phrased statutory mandate. Deciding when a regulatory scheme is 
no longer needed is a particularly legislative function. The overt 
judicial authority to modify or update archaic statutes remains, at 
present, but a glimmer in Dean Calabresi's eye.150 
But our remove, constitutionally speaking, from 1871 is not so 
easily dismissed. Change of circumstances is perhaps common to 
all statutes-at least all old ones. And updating statutes to con-
form with the times should be done by legislatures, not courts. But 
the degree of commitment to the federal Constitution exhibited by 
state judges is not the only alteration the intervening century has 
wrought. The "rights, privileges, and immunities" secured by the 
United States Constitution-and thus the scope of section 
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1985) (statute designed to 
be part of a general pattern of federal supervision); see also F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The 
Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 64 (1928) ("Sensi-
tiveness to 'states' rights' fear of rivalry with state courts and respect for state sentiment, 
were swept aside by the great impulse of national feeling born of the Civil War."). 
140 See, e.g., M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 
274 n.lOO (1980) (one possible reconciliation of Younger and Mitchum is that "while Con-
gress' mistrust was justified in the 1870's, it no longer is today"); see also Wells, Why Pro-
fessor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (1985) ("the statute 
was never intended to create such a broad cause of action"). 
'"
0 See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 176 (1982) (advocating a 
general "doctrine of judicial sunset"). 
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1983-have undergone a massive transformation. The cause of ac-
tion under the Civil Rights Act, therefore, has been subject to 
more than mere changing times. The scope of the provision has 
been so broadened that construing it in line with the framers' in-
tent could threaten the dual judicial system. 
Though section 1983 was designed as an extremely intrusive 
tool, in comparative terms, its scope was exceedingly narrow. In 
1871, the liberties assured by the constitution against the states 
did not include, for example, the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
As a result, the typical practices of local criminal process did not 
implicate federal guaranties. States could not violate the first 
amendment's speech, press, or religion clauses. Decisions recog-
nized no fundamental right to traveP51 or vote/52 nor any right to 
privacy.153 The equal protection clause carried no weight outside 
the race context, 154 and precious little even there.155 In short, none 
of the cornerstones of our modern system of constitutional review 
was yet in place. And this distinction is reflected in the legislative 
history of section 1983. 
The character of constitutional injury that the Civil Rights Act 
sought to remedy was hardly subtle. As Congressman Coburn ex-
plained: "The arresting power is fettered, the witnesses are si-
lenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal 
goes free, and the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress. "156 
Given the threatened outrage, the proponents of the statute 
claimed a willingness "to go to the extreme verge of fair construc-
tion that will justify Federal intervention. "157 But the harshness of 
the exercise of power was tempered by the perceived ease of avoid-
ing liability. As one supporter claimed, speaking of the statute as a 
101 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional a one-year 
residency requirement for state welfare program). 
102 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax). 
10
' See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional a limitation of 
right to marry). 
1 
.. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
100 The Slaughterhouse Cases envisioned little use for the equal protection clause outside 
the racial discrimination context. See id. at 81; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896) (equal protection clause not violated by regime of separate-but-equal). 
1 
.. 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 
107 See id. app. at 312 (remarks of Rep. Burchard); see also id. at 609 (remarks of Sen. 
Poole) ("The reconstruction policy, by which the political and civil equality of all citizens is 
made a constitutional right, is meant to be enforced as a measure of national safety."). 
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whole: "Every man can escape the stringency of [the bill's] action 
by remaining a quiet and peaceful citizen, and not infringing the 
rights of person, property, or liberty of another .... "158 Today, 
with the tremendous expansion of the substantive scope of the fed-
eral Constitution brought about in the last several decades, any 
local law enforcement official, public university president, state 
agency administrator, school board member, prison warden, or 
other government actor finds it considerably more difficult to 
avoid the rigors of section 1983. But, as I argue below, state judges 
are placed in a particularly exposed position.159 In 1871, section 
one of the Civil Rights Act could be violated primarily by the con-
tinued enforcement of some of the more egregious examples of 
overtly racist legislation or, perhaps, by manipulating legal process 
to harass blacks and Union sympathizers. A constitutional infrac-
tion by a local judge, therefore, was regarded as an intentional 
flouting of federal authority. Now it may be no more than a 
mistake. 
In one sense, this tension between the concerns of the Recon-
struction era and our own is a reflection of what Professor Eisen-
berg has characterized as "two competing visions of section 
1983."160 As he puts it, in "one perspective, section 1983 addresses 
a limited historical problem in post-Civil War race relations. In an-
other, it is the primary civil mechanism for vindicating ... consti-
tutional rights."161 But if the section 1983 cause of action is not to 
be limited to the particular evils that brought it into being-which 
I argue below would be an inappropriate turn 162-the potential for 
conflict between federal and state judiciaries under the "modern" 
statute is markedly increased. The flowering of the incorporation 
doctrine has resulted in the constitutionalization of a substantial 
segment of the work of state courts. The demands of the fourth, 
fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments play a predominant role in 
state criminal process. The standards of procedural due process 
and equal protection of the laws, to name but two obvious choices, 
pervade local civil process. It is hardly the case, therefore, that a 
1
"" Id. at 450 (remarks of Rep. Butler). 
1
"" See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. 
180 Eisenberg, Section 1983:. Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 Cornell L. 
Rev. 482, 483 (1982). 
181 Id. 
182 See infra notes 165-79 and accompanying text. 
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state jurist can with ease "escape the stringency" of section 1983 
by not "infringing the rights of person, property, or liberty of an-
other." A section 1983 cause of action that literally calls local 
judges to task for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by Constitution and laws" of the United States is 
much closer to a system of complete federal supervision over state 
courts now than it would have been in the late nineteenth century. 
If section 1983 were to be given its full intrusive power, the fric-
tions resulting from federal supervision would be unmitigated by 
protections from injunctive obstruction, immunities from damage 
claims, and the respect afforded through collateral estoppel. Like it 
or not, interference with even the good faith decisionmaking of 
state courts under an expansive section 1983 would pose problems 
that are potentially crippling to both judiciaries. 
A. Addressing the Dilemma 
Correctly interpreting section 1983 thus presents something of a 
dilemma. The statute was intended to be intrusive. Yet the scope 
of its original mission, at least if we tie it to the concerns of the 
framers, was quite limited. As its purview has expanded to con-
form to the provision's language, the potential for interference 
with local judicial process has expanded dramatically. If the sec-
tion is applied with the full intrusive force that its drafters envi-
sioned, complications that the framers would perhaps have re-
jected, or at least did not contemplate, arise. 
There are a number of ways one might propose to deal with the 
dilemma. The first, and probably the least satisfactory, is the tack 
the Supreme Court has chosen. The Court's decisions on section 
1983 and state courts163 deal with the tensions of section 1983 in-
terpretation by pretending that they do not exist. When the Jus-
tices opt for intervention, they cite passages of legislative history 
to support federal intrusion. When deference carries the day, opin-
ions typically maintain that "nothing in the legislative history of 
section 1983" demands a contrary conclusion. 164 Even if the results 
of the various decisions can be supported on one ground or an-
113 See supra notes 25-76 and accompanying text. 
, .. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980). This point is made effectively in Wells, The 
Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common 
Law Rules, 19 Conn. L. Rev. 53, 60-68 (1986). 
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other, the methodology is indefensible. 
The claim that the scope of section 1983 should be tied to its 
origins is more plausible. This argument has two principal vari-
ants. The first is that Mitchum v. Foster and, by implication, Pul-
liam and Monroe were wrongly decided. Those cases, authorizing 
strong federal intervention, cannot be supported, because the 
framers of the 1871 Civil Rights Act sought to remedy a very spe-
cific and dramatic evil-racial suppression in the South. To root 
the modern section 1983 cause of action, which is the conduit for a 
broad system of constitutional adjudication, in an emergency Re-
construction measure is erroneous. The tension between the broad-
ened scope of the statute and the intrusive nature of its original 
design is thus cured by returning the Act to its earlier confines.165 
The second claim is closely related to the first. If the legislative 
history of section 1983 demonstrates that it was designed to be 
strongly interventionist, its full power should be reserved for the 
circumstances the framers had in mind-actions alleging racial dis-
crimination. Accordingly, section 1983 litigation would develop 
along two tiers. In race cases, no deference to local judicial officers 
would be afforded. In the great bulk of other disputes now falling 
under section 1983's broad mantle, traditional solicitude for state 
government actors would be mandated.166 
The primary shortcoming of these suggested alterations, of 
course, is the language of the statute. Section 1983 unambiguously 
affords relief for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
••• This is perhaps the simplest way to categorize a recent article by Professor Zagrans 
calling for an extremely cramped interpretation of the "under color of law" requirement. 
See Zagrans, supra note 62. Professor Zagrans argues that the framers of § 1983 sought to 
reach only actions demanded or authorized by unconstitutional state law. Accordingly, he 
claims that Monroe was wrongly decided. The "under color" requirement applies, in his 
view, only to the enforcement of statutes that require unconstitutional behavior, specifically 
allow unconstitutional behavior, or grant unlimited powers to state actors who then proceed 
to inflict deprivations of constitutional rights. 
In my view, Zagrans dramatically underplays one of the central premises of § 1983-dis-
trust of local judiciaries. His conclusion that the actions of judicial officers are cognizable 
under § 1983 I accept, but find inconsistent with his central premises. Moreover, I think 
that any interpretation of the Ku Klux Act that leaves the actions of the Ku Klux Klan 
unregulated-as Zagrans' would-should be rejected out of hand. 
Professor Currie, writing that "there was no excuse for the Mitchum decision," has argued 
that Mitchum was wrongly decided. Currie, supra note 28, at 329. His position, however, 
turns on his reading of the appropriate contours of the Anti-Injunction Act. See id. 
166 See Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 485. 
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munities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United 
States. The text of the statute thus provides an insurmountable 
barrier to at least the stronger of the two claims. The scope of the 
rights embraced by the Act could simply not be clearer. "Reasona-
bly well-informed people"~67 could hardly conclude, from the lan-
guage of the statute alone, that the evils addressed are limited to 
race discrimination. As a result, the legislation must be "held to 
mean what it plainly expresses."168 Moreover, if the scope of sec-
tion 1983 were to be dramatically reduced, a new set of even more 
intractable problems would result. Without the benefit of the spa-
ciously worded statute, the federal courts would be forced to de-
velop a body of decisions outlining the causes of action against 
state actors created directly by the fourteenth amendment. At the 
federal level, this has proven to be a particularly thorny prob-
lem. 169 The confusion should be compounded only as a last resort. 
The two-tiered approach at least conflicts less dramatically with 
the wording of the Act. Under its premises the scope of section 
1983 would be unchanged. Only in cases of "racial [discrimination] 
and Klan . . . violence"~70 would the full intrusion of federal power 
be employed.171 An accommodation of sorts is thus achieved be-
tween the broad terms of the Act and a legislative history that 
calls for strong federal intervention. Of course, tension with the 
language of the Civil Rights Act remains. The provision suggests 
no hierarchy of rights. The phrase "deprivation of any rights," in 
fact, seems to represent the strongest declaration possible to the 
contrary. Functionally, the two-tiered methodology would leave 
the section 1983 cause of action out of step with the fourteenth 
107 2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.04, at 87. 
100 Id. § 46.01, at 73. 
100 The line of decisions launched by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), has been a troubled one. Not the least of its 
problems has been the determination of whether the rulings are constitutional or statutory 
in nature. Compare Bivens (Constitution supports a private cause of action) with Bush v. 
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (capacity of courts to award damages stems from federal courts' 
statutory jurisdiction). 
170 Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 485 (emphasizing the 1871 Act's concern with specific 
race-based problems and arguing that applications of § 1983 beyond that context must 
"seek justification in something more than the intent of section 1983's framers"). 
171 Eisenberg argues that although the 1871 Act dealt with a "limited problem," its his-
tory nonetheless "suggests a firm congressional resolve that the problem feel the full effect 
of federal power." Id. 
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amendment-the provision it was primarily designed to enforce.172 
No doubt we are far removed from the time when that amend-
ment's protections provided special scrutiny only for claims of ra-
cial inequality.173 Ultimately even this strategy suffers from a fail-
ing more familiar to the most rigid originalist doctrines of 
constitutional interpretation.174 Section 1983, like the fourteenth 
amendment itself, embraces a principle that is substantially 
broader than the evils that brought it into being.175 
There is also a significant practical problem with a two-tiered 
vision of section 1983. Commentators have rather easily character-
ized the core concern of the statute as race discrimination.176 The 
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, however, indicates that 
the provision is not so easily cabined. No doubt protecting the 
newly freed slaves from the abuses of hostile southerners was a 
central goal of the 1871 statute. The Congressional Globe also 
reveals, however, a related and substantial concern for the plight of 
Republicans and Unionists. As Senator Pratt complained, for ex-
ample, redress in the state courts "only fail[s] ... when a man of 
known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes their aid.m77 The 
hearings that preceded the passage of the Act "demonstrated that 
the Negro was not alone in his tribulations; white persons who had 
supported the Union cause or who were bold enough to advocate 
civil rights for the Negro were also the victims of terrorism in the 
South."178 Any core of section 1983 defined by the circumstances 
that led to the statute's passage, then, would need to encompass a 
broader universe than racial injustice. "Causal" wrongs include, at 
a minimum, manipulation of legal process to punish political oppo-
sition, to suppress freedom of speech, and apparently, to discour-
112 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); see also 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 
375-76 (remarks of Rep. Lowe) ("Is not this appropriate legislation to enforce the provisions 
of the [fourteenth amendment]?"). 
113 This point is made quite vividly in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292-99 (1978). 
114 See, e.g., R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 37-134 (1977)_ 
116 See generally R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 46-50 (1985) (indicating that "ab-
stract" intent of framers of fourteenth amendment may have been broader than concrete 
problems the amendment addressed). 
118 See Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 485-86. 
,.,., 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 505. 
116 Gressman, supra note 91, at 1329-30. 
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age the exercise of the right to traveP79 But once that door is 
opened, the effort to define the heart of the expansive provision is 
lost. 
It has also been suggested that the friction between section 
1983's intrusive intention and its modern scope should lead to a 
very different conclusion-that the legislative history of the stat-
ute is no longer relevant to its appropriate interpretation.180 To 
any reader of the Supreme Court's section 1983 decisions, this pro-
posal carries obvious appeal. At a minimum, it calls for the end of 
the inconsistent and haphazard use of legislative intent. It also rec-
ognizes that judicial opinions have on occasion attributed more to 
the framers of the Civil Rights Act than their century-old delibera-
tions can reasonably be asked to bear. The Supreme Court's flip-
flop on the applicability of the statute to municipalities provides a 
ready example.181 If governmental entities carrying out the respon-
sibilities and exercising the prerogatives of modern cities did not 
meaningfully exist at the local level in 1871, it is hardly fruitful to 
scour the debates in search of references to municipalities.182 The 
drafters' intentions are simply unhelpful on many of the issues of 
modern section 1983 jurisprudence. 
Courts should be reluctant, however, to disregard the intention 
of the statute's proponents when it is both ascertainable and capa-
ble of being carried forward under our existing litigation frame-
work. Rejecting legislative intent in favor of a complete system of 
17° Consider, for example, the remarks of Rep. Platt: "[N]o Republican white or black, 
especially if he is a citizen who has come here from another State[,] ... can secure as 
plaintiff or defendant anything like equal justice before the courts of the State." 42 Globe, 
supra note 31, app. at 185. 
180 See Wells, supra note 164, at 68. I do agree, however, that the legislative intention of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 simply does not speak to a great number of modern § 1983 
issues. See generally Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the 
Court's Historical Analysis, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 741 (1987) (criticizing the Court's use of history 
in § 1983 cases). 
181 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), ruled that municipalities were not "persons" for 
purposes of § 1983. That determination was reversed in Monell v. Department of Social 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See generally Snyder, The Final Authority Analysis: A Unified 
Approach to Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 633 (offering a 
method of interpreting the "policy or custom" requirement established in Monell); Whit-
man, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 225, 230-38 
(1986) (discussing Monell's overruling Monroe). 
181 See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-66 (1981) (relevance 
of original intent of § 1983 to question of punitive damage awards against municipalities). 
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common law development poses several problems. First, section 
1983 does not furnish the apparent textual warrant to construct 
judicially a set of freestanding principles for decision of the sort 
that some other federal statutes have been held to provide. Section 
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,183 for example, has 
been determined to authorize "federal courts to fashion a body of 
federal law for the enforcement of . . . collective bargaining agree-
ments."184 But 42 U.S.C. § 1988 indicates that in cases under the 
Civil Rights Act "the laws of the United States," or, if they are 
"deficient," the "common law, as modified and changed by the 
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the . . . cause is 
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution 
and laws of the United States" shall apply.185 Section 1988 has 
hardly proven a model of clarity.186 It does at least indicate that 
judges, in measuring the demands of section 1983, are not simply 
to make it up as they go. 
A freewheeling common law process poses legitimacy dangers 
from the other direction as well. If judge-made section 1983 stan-
dards result in a more restrictive cause of action than the framers 
contemplated, the judiciary apparently usurps legislative mandate. 
Mitchum, for example, declares that the Civil Rights Act was 
designed to afford injunctive relief against state judiciaries. 
Younger largely takes away what Mitchum grants. If we are to 
characterize Younger as an exercise in common law decisionmak-
ing, it is hard to comprehend the judicial warrant for rejecting, as 
Professor Redish has put it, "the product of the congressional bal-
ancing process"187 reflected in section 1983. 
This point hints at yet a third approach to the interpretation of 
section 1983. Under this theory, the courts should allow both the 
intrusive design of the statute and its expansive modern scope to 
be given full play. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act 
183 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1982). 
184 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). 
185 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1982). 
188 The relevance of § 1988 to the determination of § 1983 damages, for example, has 
proven to be complex. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
187 Redish, supra note 22, at 88 (1984). But see Bator, The State Courts and Federal 
Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 622 n.49 (1981) (concluding that 
Younger "should not be criticized as an act of judicial usurpation"). 
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demands that the statute be read to penetrate traditional concepts 
of state sovereignty. The language of the provision, meanwhile, re-
quires that it be applied broadly. This analysis leads Professor 
Redish to claim that Younger v. Harris is illegitimate "judicial 
lawmaking of the most sweeping nature."~88 Younger's premise, 
Redish correctly indicates, "rests largely on the desire to avoid in-
sulting state judiciaries by questioning their competence or good 
faith."189 Given Mitchum's ruling that section 1983 was designed 
to provide injunctive relief against distrusted state courts, how-
ever, Congress appears to have left little room for a contrary judi-
cial conclusion. 
Professor Redish's logic is unassailable. The problem with his 
position, however, flows from carrying his premises to their natural 
conclusion. It is true that Mitchum calls into question Younger's 
legitimacy. But for exactly the same reasons, Mitchum and the leg-
islative history of section 1983 cast doubt on Allen v. McCurry and 
Pierson v. Ray. And, as I shall argue below, a section 1983 cause of 
action that provides federal relief for the "deprivation of any 
rights" at the hands of state judges without the implementation of 
immunities, freedom from injunctive interference, or the safeguard 
of collateral bar would necessarily result in a debilitating clash be-
tween the two judicial systems. If this claim is true, then there are 
reasons apart from sheer judicial willfulness to interpret section 
1983 to avoid such friction. 
B. Section 1983 and Deference to State Courts 
A number of conclusions may be drawn on the basis of this read-
ing of the legislative history of section 1983. First, regardless of the 
intricacies of proper interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act, 
Mitchum's conclusion that the framers of the Civil Rights Act 
would have authorized equitable relief against state courts is cor-
rect. Second, the 1871 Congress had grave misgivings about the re-
liability of state court process. It is very unlikely, therefore, that 
the statute's proponents would have considered the possibility of 
presenting a constitutional defense to the state courts an appropri-
ate substitute for a section 1983 cause of action. Younger, as are-
'" Redish, supra note 22, at 114. 
••• Id. at 87. 
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suit, seems to be at odds with legislative intention. Third, state 
courts played a central role in the evil the Civil Rights Act was 
designed to abate. Given the broad language of the statute, it is 
very difficult to make a case based on framers' design for Pierson's 
grant of absolute judicial immunity from damage claims.190 Nor, 
for that matter, would the 1871 Congress have been likely to de-
mand the exhaustion of state remedies or to apply principles of 
collateral estoppel to limit the issues cognizable under section 
1983. In short, the circumstances of the Civil Rights Act's passage 
lead reasonably to its characterization as a fully intrusive assertion 
of federal power, designed to ensure the protection of basic civil 
liberties even at the cost of displacing, and offending, traditional 
state prerogatives. Mitchum, Pulliam, and at least the nonexhaus-
tion rule of Monroe, 191 therefore, are supported by the intent of 
section 1983's drafters. Younger, Pierson, and McCurry are not. 
The inquiry, however, cannot stop there. Given the tremendous 
expansion in substantive scope that the "rights, privileges, and im-
munities" protected by the statute have undergone in the past 
three decades, a fully intrusive section 1983 would lead to ramifica-
tions unforeseen in 1871. The gradual constitutionalization of a 
substantial portion of the state judicial process has led to a consid-
erable overlap, and thus to considerable opportunity for friction, 
between the two court systems. Consider a simple example. 
Suppose that a Virginian is indicted in the courts of his state for 
possession of cocaine. In his defense, along with declaring his inno-
190 I think, therefore, that the Third Circuit correctly read the legislative design of the 
Civil Rights Act in the 1945 decision Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 
1945), rejecting judicial immunity under § 1983: 
[T]he privilege was ... a rule of the common law. Congress possessed the power to 
wipe it out. We think that the conclusion is irresistible that Congress by enacting the 
Civil Rights Act . . . intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent indicated by 
that act and in fact did so. Section 1 of the . . . Civil Rights Act explicitly applied to 
'any person.' ... We can imagine no broader definition. The statute must be deemed 
to include members of the state judiciary acting in official capacity. 
Id. at 250. 
I argue below, however, that where necessity, rather than intent, is at issue, immunity can 
be justified. See infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text. 
191 As I have said, it is not my intent to defend Monroe v. Pape's broad interpretation of 
the under color of law requirement. Nor is the appropriate scope of the under color standard 
central to my claims. See supra note 165. I do contend, however, that Justice Douglas was 
correct in concluding that the framers of § 1983 were reluctant to relegate the victims of 
southern abuses to the vagaries of state judicial process. 
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cence, he claims that the drugs were the subject of an unreasonable 
search, that a statement was introduced against him in violation of 
his Miranda rights, and that his right to confront his accusers was 
breached by the admission of certain hearsay testimony. The mo-
tions he files to present the challenges are denied in both pretrial 
and trial rulings. Eventually, he is convicted. If the section 1983 
cause of action provides the strongly interventionist remedy the 
framers probably intended, the defendant's federal options are 
numerous. 
As soon as the state judge denies his pretrial motions to sup-
press, he could move to the federal forum seeking an injunction to 
stop the state prosecution.192 The claim could easily be made that 
the trial judge is a "person" acting "under color of' state law who 
has deprived the new federal plaintiff of a right secured by the 
Constitution of the United States. As Mitchum suggests, injunctive 
relief against a state tribunal is envisioned by section 1983. Nor 
would Younger stand as a bar to interference with the local prose-
cution: the legislative history of section 1983 offers strong rebuttal 
to the assertion that the framers of the statute would have consid-
ered the possibility of presenting a constitutional defense to the 
state court an adequate remedy at law.193 
If the criminal defendant should choose to wait until he is con-
victed to seek federal relief, he might again find a hospitable fo-
rum. After final judgment, a section 1983 damages action could be 
filed against the convicting judge. Alleging wrongful admission of 
••• It could be argued at this point that no "deprivation" has occurred for purposes of 
§ 1983 until conviction. Once a conviction has been obtained, of course, the habeas corpus 
statute-rather than § 1983-takes over. It is unclear to me, however, why the very use of a 
coerced confession or the fruits of an illegal search, or why forcing a defendant to be tried 
without counsel, for example, does not amount to a deprivation under the Civil Rights Act. 
If the defendant were subsequently acquitted and if judges did not enjoy immunity, I would 
think that a cause of action for such constitutional violations could be had pursuant to 
§ 1983. 
The potential liability for damage claims arising from the applicability of § 1983 to state 
court processes is immense. If the disappointed state court litigant seeks to challenge the 
underlying state court conviction, however, the cause of action would lie under, and be gov-
erned by, the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See generally Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-99 (1973) (holding writ of habeas corpus appropriate remedy 
for prisoners claiming unconstitutional prolongation of prison term). 
, .. See Redish, supra note 22, at 186 ("[T]he drafters of section 1983 were especially con-
cerned with the good faith of the state courts, [and] it is unlikely that they assumed that 
the ability to raise a federal defense in state court constituted an adequate remedy."). 
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the evidence contested under the fourth, fifth, and sixth amend-
ments, the new plaintiff could seek actual and punitive damages, 
as well as attorney's fees. Pierson would no longer stand as a bar to 
retroactive monetary claims because it is inconsistent with the lan-
guage and intent of section 1983. Of course, the constitutional is-
sues would have been given a full and complete airing in the con-
victing court. The rejection of the constitutional defenses by the 
local judge, however, would carry no weight in the federal tribunal. 
McCurry's determination that collateral estoppel applies to civil 
rights actions cannot be squared with the framers' distrust of state 
judiciaries. Accordingly, the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment is-
sues would be retried in the federal suit. If the federal district 
court disagreed with the local judge's disposition, an award of 
damages and attorney's fees would be mandated. 
Under a fully intrusive version of section 1983, this hypothetical 
scenario would hardly be aberrant. Theoretically, this ping-pong 
adjudication could transpire daily in every jurisdiction in the na-
tion, at least until both judicial systems broke under the pressure. 
Section 1983, if given both its complete scope and its full mandate 
of intervention, would serve to extinguish the separate existence of 
the state courts and massively overburden the federal courts. Such 
a result would hardly be the product of reasoned statutory 
construction. 
It is hard to disagree with the claim that a piece of remedial 
legislation like section 1983 should be "construe[d] in such a way 
as to make it a more rather than a less effective cure"~94 for the ills 
it set about to address. In the broadest terms, section 1983 was 
designed to provide a federal cause of action that assures state 
constitutional compliance. It is certainly possible, however, that if 
the statute is interpreted in too intrusive a fashion, the final result 
would be a remedy that is less rather than more effective. The eas-
iest example is the question of judicial immunity. It is certainly 
plausible that a state judge would be debilitated from carrying out 
her appointed tasks if she should be adjudged liable for damages, 
without benefit of immunity, for any deprivation of constitutional 
rights resulting from her actions. The sheer volume of "constitu-
tional" decisions made by trial courts, especially criminal trial 
194 R. Posner, supra note 124, 278 (discussing the canon of construction that remedial 
statutes should be read broadly). 
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courts, would engender a level of risk that even the most learned, 
and the most solvent, jurist would fmd unacceptable. In addition, 
the flood of section 1983 claims would likely overwhelm the federal 
docket, thus impeding those with serious constitutional claims 
from obtaining swift redress through the federal courts. Is it possi-
ble to conclude, therefore, that regardless of the designs of the 
framers, section 1983 can be read to embrace an absolute immu-
nity for state judges? 
Curiously, it may be that a body of decisions interpreting the 
provisions of an antitrust statute is instructive. The Sherman Act 
provides that "every contract . . . in restraint of trade or com-
merce ... is ... illegal."~911 But as Justice Brandeis pointed out in 
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, "every agreement con-
cerning trade . . . restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very 
essence."196 If a buyer closes a deal with a seller, the contract ties 
both to a particular course, limiting options and restraining the ef-
forts of others who might offer different bargains. Surely, the argu-
ment goes, the Sherman Act does not render all contracts that af-
fect interstate commerce illegal. Accordingly, "some mode of 
confining the generality of the language" of the act must be 
sought.197 To that end, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States/98 the 
Supreme Court announced that the Sherman Act would be inter-
preted pursuant to a "Rule of Reason," forbidding only contracts 
that constitute "undue restraint[s]" of trade.199 
The majority position in Standard Oil was not achieved without 
a fight. The first Justice Harlan dissented vehemently, proclaiming 
that the opinion of the Court "may well cause some alarm for the 
integrity of our institutions."200 It was his position that the adop-
tion of the "Rule of Reason" was nothing more than "judicial legis-
lation"; it altered the Sherman Act with an "exception" that was 
"not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the Government."201 
The statute, in short, says every contract in restraint of trade, not 
only unreasonable ones . 
••• 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1982) • 
••• 246 u.s. 231, 238 (1918). 
••• L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 165 (1977) • 
••• 221 u.s. 1 (1911). 
••• Id. at 60. 
200 Id. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
201 Id. at 88. 
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Of course, Chief Justice White's opinion, the majority opinion in 
Standard Oil, has carried the day. And its theory is useful in ad-
dressing the dilemma presented by the disjunction between section 
1983's genesis and its modern application. Standard Oil suggests 
that the Sherman Act cannot be read to proscribe every contract 
because it simply would not work. The statute's drafters could not 
have intended for such a result to transpire. Or if they did, they 
clearly failed to think the problem through. A statute should not 
be interpreted in a manner that will render it impossible to carry 
out. 
If we focus for the moment on the question of judicial immunity 
from damage claims under section 1983, it is possible to see the 
problem in a similar light. The Civil Rights Act applies, by its 
terms, to "every person." Judges are persons. The legislative his-
tory of the provision, if anything, actually bolsters the claim that 
no immunities for judges were contemplated. Thus both the stat-
ute and its legislative circumstances suggest full judicial liability. 
Yet surrounding circumstances, as well as the scope of section 
1983, have changed. But these changes have not merely rendered 
the statute less useful or necessary. Rather, the Civil Rights Act, 
like the Sherman Act, cannot be interpreted in accord with its lan-
guage. It simply will not work. It might well have been possible in 
1871 to hold state judges fully accountable under section one of the 
Civil Rights Act. Without an incorporated Bill of Rights and invig-
orated substantive visions of the various clauses of the fourteenth 
amendment, a state judge could perhaps have conscientiously per-
formed his duties without the paralyzing specter of threatened fed-
eral damage claims. Very likely, however, that is no longer the 
case. State adjudication involves the determination of too many 
constitutional questions, too many potential deprivations. A cau-
tious, or perhaps wise, judge would, at the least, steer far clear of 
deciding any constitutional issues against a criminal defendant. 
Her pocketbook would be threatened only if she erred on behalf of 
the state. It is possible, one might counter, that local judges could 
survive under a mere qualified immunity-thus the case I make is 
overstated. But that only moves the debate back a step. The lan-
guage and history of section 1983 support no judicial immunities, 
no matter what their degree. The recognition of any shield for 
state courts, strong or weak, results from necessity, not intention. 
But the necessity is real. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude 
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that section 1983 should be read to countenance judicial immunity 
so that the statute remains possible to effectuate. By embracing 
immunity, the statute is construed "to make it a more rather than 
less effective" tool of constitutional supervision. 
This methodology suggests a model for the interpretation of sec-
tion 1983 as it applies to state courts.202 The language and history 
of the Act imply full accountability, both in law and in equity, for 
state judges. Because the statute provides no grant of authority to 
create a common law of federal-state judicial relations, especially a 
common law that is at odds with the terminology and design of the 
statute, the full breadth of federal supervision countenanced by 
the Act should, as a general matter, be exercised. Given the dra-
matically increased opportunities for friction between state and 
federal courts that result from the modern expansion of constitu-
tional decisionmaking, however, it is necessary to incorporate some 
key aspects of deference to local judiciaries into the section 1983 
cause of action regardless of the attitudes of the framers. The "ex-
ceptions" to section 1983's regime of supervision should thus be 
measured by necessity. Deferential rules should be adopted only if 
the application of the statute's intrusive original design would 
render it a less effective tool of constitutional enforcement by 
debilitating state judicial actors or overwhelming federal oversight 
capacity. 
There would be several advantages to such an approach. First, it 
would pay continued respect to the language and mission of the 
Civil Rights Act. Legitimacy questions that arise from the unex-
plained recoguition of limitations on section 1983 liabil-
ity-typified by cases like Younger and Pierson-would be miti-
202 I realize that the arguments put forth here may have relevance beyond the determina-
tion of the appropriate relationships between state and federal courts under § 1983. The 
claims I make for judicial immunity, for example, could support findings of legislative and 
executive immunity as well. Those issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Professor Matasar has recently criticized the Supreme Court's use of history in the personal 
immunity cases. See Matasar, supra note 180. In his view, the immunity rulings underesti-
mate the common law's attempts to mitigate immunity by expanding forms of compensa-
tory relief as well as the "fundamental reordering" undertaken by the Reconstruction Con-
gress. Id. at 179. Obviously, much of my effort here supports Matasar's claim-at least with 
regard to judicial immunity. On that score, as indicated, I disagree with his assertion that 
"history is so contextual ... [and] multi-leveled" as to he of little use in measuring § 1983 
claims. Id. at 785. It is essential, of course, to determine whether judges come within 
§ 1983's "any person" terminology. I have attempted to show here that the case for inclu-
sion, as a matter of legislative intention, is ascertainable with reasonable certainty. 
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gated.203 Judicial decisions could recognize and implement one 
consistent, rather than two diametrically inconsistent, visions of 
the legislative history of section 1983. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the debate over whether to afford deference to local 
courts would be altered. In making the determination to embrace 
injunctive oversight, to allow the estoppel of claims, or to recognize 
immunities, for example, the decisive factor would be the necessity 
that such protections be provided for state tribunals. The harms 
resulting from federal intrusion would be made an overt, and 
largely determinative, aspect of the section 1983 decisionmaking 
process. And only if a clear and compelling case for state protec-
tion, one rooted in necessity, were made, would a departure from 
section 1983's mandate be called for. 
C. Application 
The series of Supreme Court decisions that set the present con-
tours of the relation between section 1983 and state courts204 
would, at least in some particulars, receive different treatment 
under the interpretive strategy suggested above. Mitchum, as al-
ready noted, provides an essentially accurate vision of section 
1983's legislative intent.2011 The Civil Rights Act was designed, at 
203 If, for example, judicial immunity were recognized under such a methodology, it would 
be accomplished clearly as a matter of statutory interpretation. The determination would 
not be plagued, as Pierson is, by a faulty reading of legislative intent. The interpretation, 
recognizing limits born of necessity, could arguably be seen as incorrect. It would not, how-
ever, be subject to the claims of illegitimacy that Professor Redish has lodged, for example, 
against the Younger doctrine. See Redish, supra note 22, at 86-87. The judgment could also 
be overturned by Congress. 
204 See supra notes 25-76 and accompanying text. 
••• It is less clear, as I have said, that Mitchum is an appropriate reading of the Anti-
Injunction Act. Professor Currie, for example, considers the decision clearly wrong in its 
determination that § 1983 is an "express" exception to § 2283. See Currie, supra note 28, at 
329. It is not my primary goal here to consider the rigors of the Anti-Injunction Act. If 
Mitchum is wrong on that issue, however, Younger becomes irrelevant. Professor Redish has 
suggested an "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the statute that would achieve many of the 
same results as Mitchum. See M. Redish, supra note 5, at 285-90. 
To my mind, Mitchum can survive in result, even if its methodology is too sweeping, as an 
express exception. Given the ambiguous nature of the injunctive prohibition as of 1871, it is 
not surprising that the Reconstruction Congress did not expressly characterize the Civil 
Rights Act as an exception to a general prohibition against injunctive interference. See the 
discussion of the modern Anti-Injunction Act's predecessors in M. Redish, supra note 5, at 
260-62. It is also true, as I have argued, that the framers of § 1983 meant to afford litigants 
an equitable claim against state jurists. At the least, then, Mitchum is correct in its conclu-
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least in part, to afford injunctive relief against state jurists. Nor 
can the demands for independence by state courts justify a total 
proscription of equitable intervention. Certainly patterns of har-
assment, systematic constitutional abridgements, or dramatically 
erroneous interpretations of federal law can be envisioned that 
mandate federal intrusion, and yet pose no overwhelming dangers 
to state judiciaries.206 As a result, a section 1983 methodology that 
gives credence to original intention, tempered by the essential de-
mands of local judicial prerogative, would reject an across the 
board no-injunction rule. 
Monroe's principle of nonexhaustion is even more easily justi-
fied. The historical case against exhaustion of judicial remedies is 
very strong.207 Intrusion upon local process, on the other hand, is 
minimal and indirect. At the other end of the spectrum, Pierson 
presents an undeniable argument for deference. Accordingly, I 
think that in ruling that state judges are absolutely immune from 
damages, the Supreme Court made the right decision-but for the 
wrong reason. Judicial immunity should be recognized under sec-
tion 1983 not because the framers contemplated it, but because lo-
cal judiciaries would be crippled without it.208 
Pulliam, the recent decision refusing to apply the Pierson rule to 
actions for prospective relief against state jurists, initially appears 
to conform to the approach I suggest. The decision, however, 
strikes me as more complex. I start from the premise that the 
sion that the right to redress created by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 cannot be given its full 
scope without recognizing an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The "express" language 
of the 1948 revision of the Anti-Injunction Act, if applied with stringency, results in some-
thing of a repeal by implication of § 1983. It seems unlikely that this is what the 1948 
Congress intended, especially given the moribund state of the § 1983 cause of action at that 
time. The statute does declare a right to equitable relief for the deprivation of constitutional 
rights at the hands of every person. This language, combined with the strong legislative 
history upon which Mitchum only incompletely draws, should be enough to escape the ban 
of§ 2283. 
208 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), for example, is such a case. Dombrowski 
was based on allegations that state court prosecutions were made not "with any expectation 
of securing valid convictions, but rather [as] part of a plan ... to harass and discourage 
[plaintiffs] ... from asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of Ne-
gro citizens of Louisiana." Id. at 482; see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (pat-
tern of discriminatory actions by state courts). 
••• See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
••• See generally Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 
Duke L.J. 879 (addressing the importance to the appellate system of judical immunity). 
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draftsmen of the Civil Rights Act envisioned no judicial immunity. 
And, as the Court has recognized in other contexts, prospective 
remedies tend to prove considerably less debilitating than the pos-
sibility of looming damage actions.209 As I have just claimed, it is 
difficult to justify a complete ban on injunctive intervention. Yet 
something troubles me about a ruling that a successful action for 
an injunction against a state judge can be accompanied by an 
award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.210 To my mind, 
Justice Powell's claim in dissent is difficult to counter: "[T]he 
availability of injunctive relief under § 1983, combined with the 
prospect of attorney's fees under § 1988, poses [a] serious threat of 
harassing litigation with ... potentially adverse consequences for 
judicial independence."211 It may well be, as the majority con-
cluded,212 that Pulliam's result is compelled by the clear intention 
of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.213 As a 
matter of section 1983 interpretation, however, the threat of a fee 
award can intimidate as easily as the threat of a damage claim. 
Under the interpretive scheme I propose, Younger v. Harris 
takes on something of a different cast. It seems clear that the "na-
tional policy" on which "Our Federalism" is based was rejected by 
the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Had they been acting 
according to its dictates, one doubts that the section 1983 cause of 
action would have been deemed necessary. Nor, for that matter, 
would they have been apt to violate traditions of state sovereignty 
so rudely by authorizing the employment of the national militia or 
the suspension of habeas corpus. The tenor of the debates over sec-
209 Compare, for example, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity for 
president from damage claims) with United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (president 
subject to at least some forms of prospective relieO. 
210 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 544 (1984). 
211 ld. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
212 See id. at 543-44. 
213 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). It remains to be asked, of course, why I would not apply a 
"rule of necessity" to § 1988 as well as § 1983. First, it seems to me that some deference to 
state judicial process is necessary not only to ensure that those processes are workable, but 
also to foster the general purposes of constitutional compliance reflected in § 1983 itself. 
The same argument is tougher to make for § 1988-granting an attorney's fee award against 
state jurists embraces rather than threatens the goals of § 1988. Second, and more practi-
cally, a recent and pointed enactment like § 1988-if modified by the judiciary-obviously 
poses greater separation of powers problems. If the attorney's fees provision burdens state 
court judges, and if, as the Pulliam Court held, Congress meant to impose such liability, it is 
properly left to Congress to cure the problem. 
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tions one and two of the Act also engenders a firm conviction that 
the forty-second Congress would have spurned the notion that the 
opportunity to present a federal defense to a state court consti-
tutes an adequate remedy at law, thus precluding section 1983 re-
lief. The essential premises underlying Younger, therefore, are at 
odds with the language and legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act.214 
At least some aspects of the intrusiveness claim that justifies 
Pierson, however, are relevant to Younger. Direct injunctions 
against state court process can obviously be highly disruptive. Not 
only are proceedings interrupted midstream, but the state judicial 
system is subjected to an inference that it cannot be trusted to run 
••• Professor Bator has sought justification for Younger in traditional equity doctrine. 
"[I]t seems to me implausible to assume that the cause of action created by ... the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 [was] meant wholly to supersede the preexisting equity doctrine that a 
good faith criminal prosecution will not ordinarily be enjoined simply because the plaintiff 
asserts that he has a valid defense to it." Bator, supra note 187, at 622 n.49. 
There are two types of responses to Professor Bator's claim. First, the modern Younger 
doctrine does not represent "pre-existing equity doctrine." Professor Redish has argued, for 
example, that the development of principles of equitable restraint took place within a uni-
tary court system-where one constituent part must obviously be reluctant to supersede 
another. See Redish, supra note 22, at 85. Other commentators have argued that the 
Younger principle actually works to remove equitable discretion. It is a "single, rigid com-
mandment of federal judicial inaction that violates even such rules as equity and comity 
could be said to have contained." Soifer & Macgill, supra note 22, at 1143; see also Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976) ("where a 
case is properly within [the scope of the Younger doctrine], there is no discretion to grant 
injunctive relief'). 
Moreover, as Professor Laycock has shown, Younger moves beyond equitable doctrine in 
other ways. A federal injunction against state court process was said in Younger to demand 
not only "irreparable," but "great and immediate" injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,46 
(1971). Traditionally, a legal remedy has been deemed "adequate" only if it is as "complete, 
practical and efficient as that which equity could afford." Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 
197, 214 (1923). But, as Professor Laycock bas shown, "[t]hree important powers of equity 
courts are not available to criminal courts in Anglo-American jurisprudence: the power to 
give interlocutory relief, the power to give prospective relief, and the power to give class 
relief." Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective 
Relief, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 199. The Supreme Court has been essentially unconcerned 
with the actual adequacy of relief state process affords in the Younger cases because the 
doctrine is one of federalism, not equity. 
I would add a second argument to these claims. After a review of the legislative history of 
the Civil Rights Act, I find it entirely "plausible" that the framers would have rejected any 
equitable doctrine that incorporated as its working premise an assumption that state courts 
will evenhandedly apply the law. State tribunals afford an adequate remedy at law only if 
they fairly and systematically enforce federal interests. The framers of § 1983 thought state 
courts fell far short of that mark. 
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its course. Granted, this "insult" to state jurists and the costs of 
possible obstruction of state proceedings were perceived by the 
framers of section 1983,215 but were thought to be outweighed by 
the need to further state constitutional compliance. Still, the op-
portunities and the obligations of federal injunctive oversight of 
state process are dramatically expanded under the modern section 
1983 cause of action. From the state courts' viewpoint, federal in-
terference is perhaps less daunting than potential liability for dam-
age claims. At least injunctions operate prospectively, and compli-
ance, even if reluctant, can be achieved. But the possibility of 
federal intervention as the result of "any deprivation" sustained at 
the hands of state courts would be debilitating both for the federal 
intruder and the local victim of national supervision.216 
The Younger question seems to turn, therefore, on the extent to 
which the normal requisites for equitable relief should be bolstered 
by the requirement of deference to state courts. Justice Black con-
cluded that federal interference ought to be barred unless the state 
case is brought in "bad faith," or pursuant to a statute "flagrantly 
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in 
every clause, sentence and paragraph."217 The bad faith or harass-
ment exception, with its apparent demand for ill-motivated or re-
peated prosecutions,218 surely poses no great threat to state judicial 
215 Congressman Storm, for example, claimed that the bill "does not even give the State 
courts a chance .... " 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 86. Congressman Holman asserted 
that "the jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . is to invade the provinces of the State courts 
with new laws and systems of administration." Id. at 258. Congressman Arthur stated that 
"[h]aving swallowed up the States and their institutions, tribunals, and functions, [the Act] 
leaves them the shadow of what they once were." Id. at 365. 
218 A variety of justifications have been offered for the Younger doctrine of deference: 
avoiding interference with state substantive goals, the desire to preserve the discretion of 
state executive officers, avoiding insult to the competence of state courts, and preventing 
interference with the orderly functioning of state judicial process. See Redish, The Doctrine 
of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 465-66 
(1978). The first two of these are directly at odds, given a showing of unconstitutionality, 
with the goals of § 1983. I have indicated as well that the "insult" implicit in the shift of 
power to the federal judiciary accomplished by the 1871 Act was certainly contemplated by 
the framers. I agree, then, with Professor Redish that the "strongest justification for 
Younger ... is the recognized need to avoid disrupting the state judicial process." Id. at 
484. I recognize that the framers of § 1983 envisioned disruption of state court process. But 
the magnitude of disruption a modern, intrusive §1983 cause of action would visit on state 
courts is far beyond their contemplation. 
217 Younger, 401 U.S. at 53 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). 
218 Id. at 49-53. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975), suggests that "bad faith" 
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independence. For purposes of section 1983 jurisprudence, how-
ever, the "flagrantly and patently violative" standard is of greater 
interest. 
Given the central premise of the Younger decision-trustworthi-
ness of state judicial decisionmaking-the patently violative excep-
tion is anomalous. Surely if state judges can be trusted, they can 
be trusted to handle the most clear-cut cases. And if the deferen-
tial doctrine is based on an unwillingness to assume the worst 
about state courts, why construct an exception that anticipates 
that judges might intentionally violate the Constitution's de-
mands? Perhaps the standard represents, therefore, an uneluci-
dated compromise between the goals of section 1983 and the unfet-
tered operation of state judiciaries. A legal standard that exposes 
state courts to easy and repeated injunctive interference threatens 
local judicial independence. But if principles of federal jurisdiction 
prohibit both equitable and legal claims against judicial process, a 
major segment of section 1983's mission has been lost. The "pa-
tently violative" standard, then, can be seen as an effort to temper 
the original designs of the Civil Rights Act with the concessions to 
necessity. If injunctive relief against state courts is available under 
section 1983, but only in cases of clear and obvious mistake, the 
constitutional oversight envisioned by the statute's framers is at 
least partially saved without crippling local adjudicators.219 
means that "the prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of ob-
taining a valid conviction." Harassment has been read to require "a series of repeated prose-
cutions." Robinson v. Stovall, 473 F. Supp. 135, 145-46 (N. D. Miss. 1979) (quoting Younger, 
401 U.S. at 49), rev'd in part on other grounds, 646 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981). In operation, 
however, the exception has proven extremely difficult to meet. See, e.g., United Books, Inc. 
v. Conte, 739 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (six obscenity prosecutions in two years insufficient). A 
commentator in 1979 reported that the exception "has never been successfully invoked." 
Comment, Limiting the Younger Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1318, 
1329 (1979). But see, for example, Tolbert v. City of Memphis, 568 F. Supp. 1285, 1288-89 
(W.D. Tenn. 1983) (finding evidence of harassment). Justice Brennan argued in 1977 that 
the Younger exceptions required showings that were "probably impossible to make." Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 498 
(1977). 
••• I have characterized the use of a "meaningful" patently unconstitutional standard as 
federal oversight of state judicial process. At present, the Younger doctrine bars federal 
interference with pending state actions. A patently unconstitutional pending state prosecu-
tion, under the regime I advocate, would be subject to injunctive interference by a federal 
tribunal under § 1983. Of course a state court may, or may not, have actually been 
presented with the federal constitutional claim in a pending state case. Because the excep-
tion I describe is designed to rectify the clear mistake, a requirement that the federal plain-
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This, however, is hardly the way the "patently violative" stan-
dard has been implemented. The Supreme Court's view of the ex-
ception is so rigid that it has never been deemed satisfied.220 Trai-
nor v. Hernandez221 presented the Court with a viable opportunity 
to explore the standard, and the results were not encouraging. The 
trial judge had found the state attachment provision challenged in 
Trainor to be "patently violative of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."222 The Supreme Court overturned the 
conclusion, maintaining (somewhat surprisingly given the language 
of the trial opinion) that "even if such a finding was made below, 
which we doubt, . . . it would not have been warranted in light of 
our cases."223 Trainor's curt treatment of the exception has led 
commentators to conclude, not unreasonably, that it "has become 
meaningless. "224 
Under the reading of section 1983 that I propose, the Supreme 
Court's effective interment of the Younger exceptions is unfortu-
nate, and wrong. It is true, of course, that if Younger's stated ra-
tionale is dispositive, the exclusions are misguided from the out-
set.2211 But "Our Federalism," whatever its content, cannot be 
defined without reference to the demands of section 1983. If the 
Younger exceptions are in fact not that, but mere illusory compo-
nents of an absolute bar to injunctive intervention, then, at a mini-
mum, Mitchum has been buried.226 A central tenet of the Civil 
tiff have actually presented the constitutional claim in the pending state trial would be 
called for. I would reject, however, the requirement announced in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 
420 U.S. 592 (1975), that a federal litigant, under Younger principles, "must exhaust his 
state appellate remedies before seeking relief in District Court." Id. at 608. 
••• See Comment, supra note 218, at 1329. 
221 431 u.s. 434 (1977). . 
••• Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N. D. Ill. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Trainor 
v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
••• Trainor, 431 U.S. at 447. 
••• See Laycock, supra note 214, at 198; see also Soifer & Macgill, supra note 22, at 1210 
(addressing Trainor's refusal to make a substantive acknowledgement of the exception); 17 
C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4255, at 583-84 (1978) 
(the "universe" of exceptions "that can be established is virtually empty."). 
••• See Comment, supra note 218, at 1329 (1979) ("exception[s] seem[ ] inconsistent with 
the principles underlying equitable restraint"). 
••• I realize, of course, that Younger bas not expressly been construed to extend to all 
civil cases, thus leaving some potential room for Mitchum to survive. The civil-criminal 
distinction, however, is not a compelling one given the premises of the doctrine. Nor, ulti-
mately, do I think it is long for this world. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 
1519, 1526 (1987); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). 
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Rights Act of 1871-that the actions of state jurists are federally 
cognizable-is lost as well. 
A handful of federal trial courts have treated the exception in a 
meaningful way. In one case, for example, the court found that a 
statute clearly violating the first amendment and recently upheld 
by the highest court of the state "appear[ed] to be patently uncon-
stitutional," thus excusing the rigors of Younger. 227 In another, the 
district judge determined that a pending state action presented 
dangers of an "appalling infringement of the rights of free speech 
and free exercise of religion,"228 and thus concluded that the 
Younger doctrine "must give way."229 Such an approach secures a 
core of federal supervision so that the intentions of the Civil 
Rights Act are given at least some vitality. And unlike an open 
balance of federal and state interests,230 a "patent" unconstitution-
ality standard leaves state judiciaries a broad range of unencum-
bered operation. With the implementation of meaningful excep-
tion, therefore, Younger itself can be justified as an effort to bend 
the intentions of section 1983 to accommodate modern necessity. 
Allen v. McCurry is a harder case. As an interpretation of sec-
tion 1983, the opinion is simply wrong. Justice Stewart concluded 
that "nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 
proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state 
court judgment."231 "[P]roves," of course, is the operative word. It 
is literally true that the framers never mentioned collateral estop-
pel in express terms. Given the restrictive state of the doctrine in 
1871, it would have been unnecessary for them to have considered 
the question had they desired to do so.232 But the demand for such 
proof is hardly a fair way to read the intention of section 1983. The 
227 Tolbert v. City of Memphis, 568 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Tenn. 1983). 
228 New Jersey-Philadelphia Presbytery v. New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ., 482 F. 
Supp. 968, 976 (D.N.J. 1980). 
210 ld. at 978. 
230 See, for example, Redish, supra note 216, at 486-87 (advocating case-by-case balance 
weighing (1) potential for disruption of state court process, (2) familiarity of issue to state 
tribunals, and (3) reviewability of the claim on habeas corpus). Of course, such a standard 
would greatly increase the call for federal supervision. First, the balance would be more 
easily swayed in favor of federal intervention than would a patently unconstitutional stan-
dard. Second, even if ultimately unsuccessful under the balancing approach, a far greater 
number of litigants would be encouraged to seek federal review as the result of the open-
ended inquiry demanded. 
231 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980) (emphasis added). 
232 See Currie, supra note 28, at 329. 
1008 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 73:959 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was rooted in distrust for state officials, 
including state judges. If the McCurry Court had asked simply, 
"Would the drafters of section 1983 have foreclosed federal consid-
eration of any issues that were presented, or could have been 
presented, in a prior state trial?," the legislative history reveals 
that the response would have been an unequivocal "no."233 
But the Supreme Court has now apparently followed Professor 
Currie's lead and ruled that preclusion, even in section 1983 cases, 
is demanded by the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738.234 That conclusion may be the correct one, though it 
seems a strange way to treat a federal caur;;e of action that was 
designed, at least in part, to operate against state tribunals. It 
would also appear that the analysis of legislative history that ren-
dered section 1983 an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act would 
go a long way toward a determination that the Civil Rights Act is 
not bound by the normal dictates of section 1738. Still, the ques-
tion is hardly an easy one. It should be added, though, that when 
this decision is added to Younger and Pierson, the result is strik-
ing. If Younger completely bars injunctive oversight of pending 
claims, Pierson obviates damage actions, and principles of collat-
eral estoppel prevent even subsequent equitable or declaratory re-
233 See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Osborn: 
The question now is, what and where is the remedy? I believe the true remedy lies 
chiefly in the United States district and circuit courts. If the State courts had proven 
themselves competent to suppress the local disorders, or to maintain law and order, 
we should not have been called upon to legislate . . . at all. But they have not done 
so. We are driven by existing facts to provide for the several States in the South what 
they have heen unable fully to provide for themselves; i.e., the full and complete ad-
ministration of justice in the courts. And the courts ... must be ... the United 
States courts. 
42 Globe, supra note 31, at 653. 
It seems to me unlikely that Senator Osborn actually meant to provide a federal forum, 
unless precluded by local rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
234 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides in part: "Such acts, records and judicial proceedings 
... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ..• as 
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which 
they are taken." See Currie, supra note 28, at 325-32 (advocating application of preclusion 
via§ 1738 in§ 1983 actions). Allen v. McCurry's embrace of§ 1738 was tenuous. See Mc-
Curry, 449 U.S. at 95-99 (discussing a "background" of common law and§ 1738 preclusion). 
More recently, however, in a§ 1983 case the Court indicated that "[i]t is now settled that a 
federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be 
given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered," and 
cited§ 1738. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). 
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view of state judicial process, the sweep is clean. A cause of action 
that was designed in no small measure to ensure state judicial ac-
countability essentially has no applicability to state courts. If sec-
tion 1738 does demand preclusion in section 1983 cases, therefore, 
the call for a meaningful exception to the Younger principle is 
heightened, rather than diminished. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The body of judicial decisions outlining the relationship between 
the section 1983 cause of action and state judicial process is a 
troubled one. Our highest Court has done a poor job of handling 
the tensions resulting from the application of a seemingly intrusive 
statutory claim to local tribunals traditionally enjoying indepen-
dence from federal trial court supervision. Rather than openly con-
fronting and attempting to accommodate the disparity between the 
language and design of section 1983 and the present demands of 
state judicial process, opinions have employed two diametrically 
opposed visions of the legislative history of the statute to accom-
plish either deference, or intervention, as the Justices have thought 
appropriate. Clearly, there are better ways to decide cases. And the 
inconsistent uses of legislative intention have led, not surprisingly, 
to claims that one aspect or another of the Court's jurisdictional 
doctrine is either incorrect, illegitimate, or both. 
This essay has suggested that the legislative history of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 reveals that the framers of the statute were far 
more concerned with achieving constitutional compliance than 
with respecting traditional notions of state sovereignty. As a result, 
they fashioned a highly interventionist cause of action that was 
designed, in no small measure, to assure the constitutional ac-
countability of state courts. It is very unlikely, therefore, that they 
would have supported the recognition of the various immunities 
and shields from national intervention that litter the law of federal 
courts. 
Still, the legislative design of section 1983 does not resolve all of 
our problems. The dramatic expansion in recent decades of the 
"rights, privileges, [and] immunities· secured by the Constitution 
and laws" of the United States has made it impossible to imple-
ment a fully intrusive section 1983 cause of action without doing 
substantial damage to the independence and operation of the state 
courts. Accordingly, I have suggested a method of interpreting the 
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demands of section 1983 as it applies to state judiciaries that 
repects the aims of the provision without debilitating local deci-
sionmaking. Under the analysis suggested here, the bulk of the de-
cision outlining the relationship between the section 1983 claim 
and state judicial actors, with some modifications, can be justified. 
Those determinations would constitute a more coherent jurispru-
dence, however, if they would directly explore the aims of the Civil 
Rights Act and the impact that the implementation of those aims 
will have on the legitimate demands of state court process. 
